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Preface 
The report is the result of the economic assessment of fishing gear trials carried out in 
the NECESSITY (NEphrops and CEtacean Species Selection Information and Tech-
nologY) project under the 6th Framework Programme, Scientific Support to Policy 
(SSP), with specific focus on Species-Selective Fishing. The work has been carried 
out with the cooperation of researchers from five institutes working in fisheries eco-
nomics. 
 
The methodology applied is cost-benefit analysis used in such a way that economic, 
biological and technical information form composite parts. An integrated model is 
developed as a basis for the results presented. However, the success of the economic 
assessment has been dependent of the results of the gear trials and the available sup-
plementary information.  
 
NECESSITY comprises gear trials within nephrops fisheries with by-catches of 
demersal species, and in pelagic trawl fisheries with by-catches of sea mammals.  
 
Hans Frost, FOI, (DK) has headed the nephrops part of the bio-economic analysis, 
and been mainly responsible for the assessment of the nephrops trials in the Skager-
rak, Kattegat and the Fladen Ground. James Innes, CEMARE, (UK) has been mainly 
responsible for the assessment of trials around Aran, in the Clyde, and around the 
Farne Islands. Sebastien Metz, CEDEM, (F) has been mainly responsible for the cases 
in the Bay of Biscay. 
 
Philip Rodgers, Erinshore Economics Limited, (UK) has headed the pelagic trawl part 
and been mainly responsible for the cases covering pelagic trawling for sea bass, 
while Erik Buisman, and Kees Taal, LEI, (NL) have been mainly responsible for the 
case of Dutch pelagic freezer trawlers. Finally, Jan-Tjeerd Boom, FOI, (DK) has been 
responsible for the Section concerning willingness to pay for the conservation of sea 
mammals. 
 
 
 
Director General Søren E. Frandsen 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
Copenhagen, September 2007 
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Methodology 
Economic Impact Assessment 
Economic Impact Assessment has become an explicit part of studies carried out for 
the European Union with respect to implementing new policies, as outlined in the 
standards and requirements provided in the Commission Guidelines on Impact As-
sessment (SEC (2005)791 of 15 June20052).1  
 
These guidelines specify the key analytical steps in impact assessment as: 
 
1. Identify the problem. 
2. Define the objectives. 
3. Develop main policy options. 
4. Analyse their impacts. 
5. Compare the options. 
6. Outline policy monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The economic assessments may take several forms, of which cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) and cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) are the most important; for an introduc-
tion to project appraisal see Perman, May, McGilvray and Common (2003, pp.- 351-
473). CBA and CEA are the methods applied in the NECESSITY project. In general, 
one can distinguish between top down approaches and bottom up approaches as listed 
below in Table 1.1. Top down approaches address the problem from the manager’s 
point of view and make use of extensive calculations, while the bottom up approach 
starts out from the population and searches for some sort of consensus. While the top 
down approaches listed in Table 1.1. are alternatives, partly depending on the type 
and amount of information that is available, the bottom up approach shows the ele-
ments that could be included, fully or partly, in this approach. 
 
Of the top down approaches, CBA (see Table 1.1.) requires most information as it re-
quires information on both benefits and costs. Cost Minimization Analysis (CMA) 
and CEA require information on either costs or benefits only, while Cost-Utility (CU) 
requires information about utility but not necessarily in economic terms. Finally, the 
optimisation approach offers the possibility of including several conflicting goals 
__________________________________ 
1 
 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/sec_2005_0791_en.pdf  
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(benefits). Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) accounts for benefits and costs in “physical” 
terms i.e. no value assessment is included. This approach is more often used in natural 
science than in social science. 
 
The general aim in NECESSITY is to apply the CBA method. However, the benefit 
side includes catch and hence fish stock projections that are associated with great un-
certainty. Moreover, ideally a CBA is performed to make it possible to choose be-
tween alternatives. In NECESSITY, however, the technical trials have been specified 
beforehand, which means that the economic analyses are rather closer to impact as-
sessments in the sense that these particular gear changes are assessed and light thrown 
on the net benefit from implementation.  
 
Although none of the cases in NECESSITY can be subjected to a complete CBA, or 
any of the other approaches, the description of an ideal approach is carried out in or-
der to present the framework with which the cases are confronted. The purpose is to 
make it more clear how projects (cases) should be designed to make it possible to ac-
complish proper economic impact assessments, and which assumptions and short cuts 
it has been necessary to undertake in the assessment of the cases within the NECES-
SITY project itself. 
 
Table 1.1. Types of Economic Impact Assessment 
 
Top-down approaches: Bottom-up approach 
 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) Purpose/output sought – ranging from 
Cost-Minimization (CMA)   - general feedback to  
Cost-Effectiveness (CEA)  - binding agreement (regulation) 
Cost-Utility (CU)                   Membership selection – e.g. 
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA)  - agency chooses members or 
Optimization  - everyone can participate (selfselection) 
  - Multi Attribute Utility (MAU)                   Decision rule – 
  - Multi Objective Programming (MOP)  - consensus or 
  - majority voting  
                  Who provides charges 
                  Who provides information 
 
Derived from Kjærsgaard, Jens (2003): Approaches to environmental project appraisal, an essay. Institute of 
Food and Resource Economics, Copenhagen 
 
 
A complete execution of a CBA contains as a minimum the following elements: 
 
1. Define project and alternatives 
2. Identify economically relevant impacts 
3. Determine relevant time horizon 
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4. Physically quantify impacts 
5. Calculate a monetary evaluation 
6. Discount costs and benefits 
7. Calculate net present value 
 
The CBA evaluates benefits and costs of a project over a time-period from society’s 
point of view. In this respect, the behaviour of people affected by the project must be 
taken into consideration. Projects may be beneficial from society’s point of view but 
not necessarily from the view of the people that are affected. Alignment between pri-
vate and societal objectives may be achieved either by carrot (money transfer) or by 
stick (enforcement and control). Because of the market failure in fisheries, large dis-
crepancies between the view of society and people affected may be foreseen. This is 
partly caused by differences in time horizons and partly by externalities.  An example 
of the latter is that a reduction in discards that may be beneficial to society may not 
necessarily be to the benefit of the fisherman. Therefore the incentive to fishermen to 
comply with changes, for example in fishing gear, is very much dependent on the 
profit they can expect from such changes. 
 
Item four in the execution of a CBA includes both biological and technical impacts.  
The biological impacts in particular are associated with uncertainty when projections 
are made for a long time into the future. Such projections are however only carried 
out in NECESSITY for cases where the requisite initial information is available, i.e. 
for nephrops in the Kattegat. 
 
The monetary evaluation in item 5 must be carried out using real prices, which basi-
cally implies that prices must be set net of taxes and subsidies. Prices must, as such, 
reflect the real use of resources. From the fisherman’s point of view taxes are costs 
but from society’s point of view taxes are financial transfers as they do not entail the 
real use of factors of production and commodities. The economic evaluation must 
therefore include an analysis in real economic terms and also in financial terms where 
the latter take into account the payments the fishermen are confronted with i.e. inter-
est payments on loans, depreciation of capital, etc. In practice, many of the costs and 
earnings items are generally the same from society’s and individual’s points of view, 
but in cases where there are differences, for example in the interest rate (costs), these 
differences will be dealt with explicitly. 
 
Discounting benefits and costs rests on the assumption that present production and 
consumption will be valued higher than future production and consumption. The dis-
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count rate takes this into account but society and fishermen may have different dis-
count rates and time horizons. Society’s time horizon is longer than the fisherman’s 
i.e. if the fisherman is not able to meet his economic obligations in the short-run, he 
does care about the long-run. 
 
External costs and benefits, for example the change in the size and value of fish 
stocks and all management costs, are disregarded by fishermen, but not by society.  
 
Verbally, this can be expressed from society’s point of view as:  
 
Economic profit = net present value (benefits – costs + external benefits – external 
costs – costs of information, management, control, and enforcement) 
 
Finally, distributional aspects must be considered. The strong criteria for accepting a 
change is that the net present value is positive and that nobody is worse off when 
some are better off (the Pareto criterium). This criterium is, however, prohibitively 
strong, and a weak version is more commonly used such that if the benefit to those 
being made better off is sufficient to enable those being made worse off to be com-
pensated and still produce a positive net present value then the project can be carried 
out.  
The model 
CBA and decision criteria 
Formally, the problem is expressed as in (1). Execution of a CBA requires that differ-
ent projects are compared with the aim of finding the best project economically. The 
limiting case is where one project (the baseline) continues as hitherto, and the alterna-
tive project comprises implemented changes. Formula (1) shows the model for the 
baseline: 
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Where the index i is the species; j is the fleet segment; and t is time. NPV0 is the net 
present value (profitability of investment) in the base case, H is landings (harvest), P 
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is fish price, C is variable costs, G is fixed costs, and V is external effects (net), for 
example, willingness to pay for the survival of whales, or if discarding is considered 
ecologically harmful. U is management costs (information gathering, administration, 
monitoring, control and enforcement). Finally, I is investment costs in gear, and d is 
the discount rate. 
 
For a project with changes to the base case the formula appears as: 
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The variables in (2) are the same as for (1) but different data inputs will be used for 
different projects. Therefore, the decision rule as to whether a new project should be 
accepted or rejected is based on the difference between NPV for the whole fleet, 
compared for projects of the same duration, as shown in (3) and (4): 
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This decision rules means that if a change in gear yields a higher net present value for 
the whole fishery, i.e. all pertinent fleet segments, the project should be accepted, and 
vice versa. That means, on the other hand, that some fleet segments may be worse off 
following the gear change while others may become better off.  
Selectivity, catches and landings 
The calculation that is accomplished by using Equations (1) to (4) requires informa-
tion about all the variables H, P, C, W, M, I, and d. Information about landings, H, is 
derived from biological models in which catches (landings and discards) are esti-
mated. In age-structured models the number of fish, for example, at age 1 in year 1, is 
reduced to the number of fish at age 2 in year 2 and so forth. This decay is caused by 
natural mortality and by fishing mortality. The share that is caught is the portion of 
total mortality known as fishing mortality, the remainder being natural mortality. Fur-
ther, only fish above a minimum size are allowed to be landed. The rest are either dis-
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carded or landed illegally and will, therefore, not appear in the recorded landings of a 
vessel.  
 
A change in gear specification can be expected to lead to a change in selectivity.  Se-
lectivity is the proportion of fish in each age-group that is retained in the gear. If se-
lectivity is high the probability of escape for small fish is high. An example of the se-
lection of two different mesh sizes is shown in Figure 1.1. With the small mesh size 
the probability of being retained is 50% or more for fish at a length at 32.5cm or 
more. If the mesh size is increased to 110mm the probability of being retained is 50% 
or more for fish at a length of 40 cm or more. With the high mesh size the probability 
of a fish 32.5cm in length being retained is only 6% in this example. Hence selectivity 
increases with mesh size. 
 
Figure 1.1. An example of gear selectivity 
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Formally, catches of each species as a function of age-group can be expressed as 
shown in Equation (5).  
 
(5) 
0
0
0
,
0
, ))(exp(1(
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a
aatata FM
FFMNC ++−−=  
Where the indices are: a, age-group, t year. C is catch, N is the number of fish, M and 
F are natural and fishing mortality respectively. The baseline fishing mortality is de-
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noted by 0, i.e. the fishing mortality for the baseline mesh size. It is assumed that re-
cruitment to the stock N is constant over time, i.e. that N0,t=N0 for all t. 
 
The selectivity of the gear is implicitly captured by Fa in Equation (5). The selection 
can be expressed in various forms; one is (ICES 1996): 
 
(6) 
)llrexp(
S ⋅−−+= 501
1
  or
 
)llrexp(
)llrexp(
S ⋅++
⋅+=
50
50
1
 
 
where S is the probability of being retained. The length of the fish is denoted by l. The 
parameter, l50, is the length of a fish that has a 50% probability of being retained, and 
r is the distance between l75 and l25. The parameters l and r are species and gear spe-
cific. In other specifications of selectivity functions S is explicitly a function of the 
mesh size keeping the parameters l and r constant. 
 
Given knowledge of the relationship between selectivity and length (Equation 6), the 
catch equation can be reconstructed for the new mesh size by scaling the baseline 
fishing mortality by varying the selectivity parameters. As the catch is specified as a 
function of fishing mortality by age-groups (cf. Equation 5), selectivity S must be 
transformed in such a way that S also matches fishing mortality F by age-groups. 
 
Often weight and not length is recorded at age-group level e.g. in ICES reports. The 
weight information can however be used to calculate length-at-age by use of the rela-
tionship shown by Equation (7), see Coull et al. (1989): 
 
(7)  or  βα lw ⋅= βα
/wl 11 ⋅=  
  
where α and β are species-specific parameters taking into account whether the pa-
rameters are for gutted or un-gutted fish. If neither weight nor length information by 
age-group is available, one possible method is to use a growth function, for example 
that of von Bertalanffy (1938): 
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(8) 0(1 exp( ( )))l L K a a∞= ⋅ − − ⋅ −  
 
where is the maximum length of a fish, and K and a0 are species-specific parame-
ters.  
∞L
 
Combining information by age groups of F, w, and l makes it possible to calculate S 
for age-groups and hence Fa. By using the ratio between selectivity in the base case 
(denoted 0) and in the case of gear change (denoted 1) to scale F for each age-group, 
the modified Equation (9) will appear as: 
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While catches occur for all age-groups, only fish from age-groups over a certain 
minimum length are allowed to be landed. Therefore, the landings (or harvest) in-
serted in Equation (2) are calculated as: 
 
 (10)  ∑
=
=
A
sizemina
t,at,i CH
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Discards are then calculated as . However, they are omitted in the subse-
quent calculations. 
∑=
=
sizemina
a
t,aC
0
1
 
In the present model, future catches are determined by the fishing mortality rate F, 
influenced only by the variations entailed in changes in selectivity. However, a more 
comprehensive approach as to how changes in selectivity may impact upon profitabil-
ity, and hence future effort, could be included. An indication of how that could be 
done is found in Hoff and Frost (2006). 
 
Finally, when the calculation is carried out at fleet segment level the fishing mortality 
rate F must be adjusted appropriately. This is done by using the recorded landings of 
the pertinent species of each fleet segment in proportion to the total landings of all 
segments J of the pertinent species: 
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Hence, at fleet segment level, the equation using partial fishing mortality rates looks 
like: 
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Prices 
The definition of price effects in economics is of variations in demand caused by 
changes in price. The effects dealt with here are inverse effects; namely changes in 
aggregated prices for a species caused by alterations in the total supply of each spe-
cies arising from adjustments in the composition of age groups. Thus there is a dis-
tinction between two price effects. The first is the effect of changes in catch composi-
tion with respect to the size of the fish. For most species larger fish receive a higher 
price when compared to small fish.  The price for each size of fish is kept constant but 
as composition changes the aggregated price will change. The other effect is caused 
by general changes in supply and demand, and is brought about by market price elas-
ticities. The latter effect is disregarded in the NECESSITY project mainly because 
most gear changes are local in nature compared to the fact that the supply of many 
species is of a global nature. That means that local supply changes have little impact 
on total supply. 
 
The first effect, however, is included and it is necessary to produce information about 
prices as a function of age group. This type of information is not recorded. What is 
recorded, however, are the prices by size-group frequently defined by the minimum 
weight of a fish or the maximum number of fish per kg. When this information is 
combined with the average weight per fish in the age groups a price can be estimated 
for each age group. This approach means that in Equation (1) and (2) of the CBA, 
landings and prices are essentially estimated at age-group level. 
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Costs 
Costs are divided into variable and fixed costs specified by fleet segment. In princi-
ple, all costs influenced by the gear change should be included. However, in the ap-
plication of the NECESSITY model fixed costs are disregarded because the influence 
on them from a gear change is difficult to identify in the long-run. The change in 
fixed costs is linked to changes in the capacity of the fleet, i.e. the number of vessels 
and their size. These changes are of a long-run nature and are influenced by entry and 
exit considerations, see Hoff and Frost (2006). 
External effects 
External effects, either positive or negative, are economic consequences for other 
people who cannot avoid them. They are not subject to price determination in a mar-
ket and are therefore difficult to quantify. Examples of external effects are the value 
(cost) of reducing the whale population or other non-marketable by-catch species. A 
chapter in this report is specifically devoted to that kind of externality. Another ex-
ample is the value (cost) of discards from an ecological or an ethical point of view. 
Changes in discarding are partly included in the catch function because a reduction 
increases the stock size in the long-run.  
Management costs 
Management costs are generally disregarded. They comprise the costs of information 
gathering, administration, monitoring, and control and enforcement in the base case 
compared to the case with gear changes. Not least, information gathering in terms of 
research projects can be rather expensive. However, research is difficult to quantify in 
terms of benefit to society, and net research costs are often disregarded. It is reason-
able to assume that monitoring and enforcement costs will increase but it is difficult 
to assess the magnitude of such an increase. 
Investment in gear 
A change in gear will entail higher investment costs in the short-run, in particular if a 
new regulation is implemented at short notice and without derogations. If the changes 
are introduced over a period of time making it possible to depreciate the original gear, 
extra costs will only occur if the new gear has a design that makes it permanently 
more expensive than the original. Certain types of gear, for example, with panels 
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(windows with larger mesh sizes) may not be more expensive while gear with grids 
(steel or fibreglass devices) may be permanently more expensive. Makers of fishing 
trawls have indicated that the cost of gear changes intended to improve selectivity 
may be accomplished at costs less than €3,000 per trawl. 
Discount rate 
Discounting is a technique used to compare costs and benefits that occur in different 
time periods. It is a separate concept from inflation, and is based on the principle that, 
generally, people prefer to receive goods and services now rather than later. This is 
known as ‘time preference’, see HM Treasury (2003). For individuals, time prefer-
ence can be measured by the real interest rate on money lent or borrowed. Amongst 
other investments, people invest at fixed, low risk rates, hoping to receive more in the 
future (net of tax) to compensate for the deferral of consumption now. These real 
rates of return give some indication of their individual pure time preference rate. So-
ciety as a whole also prefers to receive goods and services sooner rather than later, 
and to defer costs to future generations. This is known as ‘social time preference’; the 
‘social time preference rate’ (STPR) is the rate at which society values the present 
compared to the future.  
 
In the United Kingdom, the HM Treasury advises researchers to use a STPR at 3.5% 
before tax, while the Danish Treasury recommends 6%, see Kjellingbro (2004)2, who 
discusses the magnitude of this number and indicates that it may be too high.  
 
As described in HM Treasury’s definition of STPR above, a difference between indi-
viduals and society’s discount rates could easily occur. Time preferences and risk 
perception will differ, and normally individuals will require a higher discount rate 
than society (which is able to spread risk and use time horizons that cross genera-
tions). For society, tax is not considered a cost while this is the case for the individual.  
 
For the fisherman taking into account tax, the capital market rate of return on bonds 
and equities, and risk, which could be significant in fisheries, a much higher rate of 
return is demanded. A study carried out for Irish fishermen by Hillis and Whelan 
(1992) indicates discount rates above 20%. A “laboratory study” in which a number 
of individuals were given a small amount of money which could be spent freely either 
on commodities or placed in the “bank” also indicated very high interest rates (above 
__________________________________ 
2 Although this paper is in Danish many references in the paper are in English 
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20%) if people were able to defer from spending the money on commodities and put 
it in the bank (Harrison, Lau, and Williams, 2002). 
 
The net present value (NPV) calculated from society’s point of view and from the in-
dividuals’ point of view would therefore differ, and projects accepted as giving a net 
benefit by society may be rejected as loss-makers by individuals. The discount rate 
used in the NECESSITY case studies varies but is generally set at 5%.  Sensitivity 
calculations are carried out with higher interest rates to assess individuals’ inclination 
to accept the project in terms of gear change.  
Scope of the analysis 
It is important to design the CBA in such a way that all costs and earnings arising 
from the changes in the fishing gear are included in the calculations. It is often diffi-
cult to delimit the analysis because the impact of gear changes declines the longer the 
distance from the direct changes to the persons affected. The present analysis is re-
stricted to trawl fisheries that are directly involved. However, other fisheries targeting 
the same species may also be affected, for example, gill-netters and seiners fishing for 
demersal species in competition with the trawlers. The benefits and costs accruing to 
these fisheries are only included briefly in discussion about positive or negative net 
contribution. Downstream effects are also discussed only in general terms or omitted. 
1.3 Data 
The modelling approach developed is very demanding of data and it is not possible in 
any of the cases shown in Table 1.2 below to obtain all the required information. 
However, a classification is undertaken with the aim of assessing the extent to which 
the required data exists. There are four options to take into account as shown in Table 
1.2 and discussed below.  
 
Tabel 1.2. Model and data options 
 
 Data-rich Data-poor 
 
Fleet approach Model: Equations 1-10 
All relevant fleet segments 
All relevant species 
All variables included 
Model: Equations 1-4 
Limited number of fleet segments 
Limited number of species 
Only landings value, variable costs 
 
Fishery approach 
 
Model: Equations 1-10 
No breakdown on fleet segments 
All relevant species 
All variables included 
 
Model: Equations 1-4 
No breakdown on fleet segments 
Limited number of species 
Only landings value, variable costs 
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1.3.1. Fleet approach 
The most comprehensive option is the data-rich fleet approach. A fleet is defined by 
characteristics describing the vessels e.g. length, engine power, type of gear, etc.  All 
fleet segments affected by the proposed gear change must be identified. In this re-
spect, it is necessary to choose impact criteria in terms of a relevant variable, and the 
magnitude of the variable that is used to assess the degree to which a fleet segment is 
affected. If, for example, landings value is chosen as the impact criteria, how large a 
share of the total landings value of the segment should the species affected by the 
gear change constitute to qualify the segment to be selected for the analysis? This is 
not a straightforward choice to make, but it is important in order to get a picture of the 
objective of the gear change. Is the purpose of the gear change, for example, aimed at 
increasing landings of nephrops, or is the aim to reduce by-catches and discards? 
 
The data-rich fleet approach makes it possible to calculate distributional effects i.e. 
which segments may gain and which may lose. 
 
The data-poor approach will often identify itself by a lack of fish stock assessment 
which makes it impossible to calculate the stock effects from gear changes. The ap-
proach is not entirely irrelevant, however, because indications of changes in landings 
prices and costs may be present for each of the pertinent fleet segments. 
 
The borderline case is where information is available for only one segment and one 
species in terms of landings value and variable costs.  
1.3.2. Fishery approach 
In the fishery approach, fleet segments are disregarded and the platform is the species.  
A fishery could be defined as landings of a certain number of species from a certain 
area. Principally, costs will have to be disaggregated and assigned to those fisheries. 
If this is not possible, it means that only the contribution to the NPV of the value of 
landings from this fishery (several or single species) can be considered. Costs are thus 
disregarded, or assumed not to vary between the baseline case and the case with gear 
change. This is a less complicated approach which is pertinent if stock assessments 
are carried out, but no information is available about landings and costs at the fleet 
segment level. 
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The distinction between the data-rich and data-poor fishery approaches is mainly of a 
biological nature. The borderline case in the data-poor approach is where stock as-
sessment is available for only one species. Changes in landings can be evaluated by 
use of Equations (2) and (5). If no such stock assessment is available, an assessment 
could still be carried out based on estimates of future landings after the gear change 
compared with estimated landings before the gear change. 
1.3.3. Scaling 
Execution of a CBA requires data to be collated from many different sources. There-
fore preparing the data input is often time-consuming and in certain cases almost pro-
hibitive for the execution of the CBA. 
 
One particularly difficult problem is to link the data collated from the “catch model” 
(Equations 5-10) to the CBA formulas (Equation 1-2). Firstly, stock projections are 
carried out subject to a number of assumptions, such as constant recruitment, fixed 
distribution of fishing mortality by age-group, etc.; assumptions that will for certain 
not hold for more than a limited time period. However, the purpose of the CBA is to 
assess the effect of a specific measure and not the general effect taking all possible 
changes into account. The CBA is as such a projection rather than a prognosis. In 
prognoses, the effects of other changes can easily overshadow and obscure the effect 
of the change in question, but it is not the purpose of the CBA to evaluate the effect of 
these other changes. 
 
Another difficult problem is related to the estimates of important parameters that form 
the basis for projections of the base case and the scenario with changes, i.e. the cali-
bration of the baseline scenario. The selectivity parameters used to calculate S (Equa-
tion 6) are estimated based on surveys carried out with specific vessels fishing in spe-
cific periods and specific areas. The question is to which extent these estimates can be 
used in CBAs covering not only the annual activity of the particular survey vessels, 
but the entire pertinent fleets’ activities? 
 
This scaling problem may in fact prevent a CBA and any economic impact assess-
ment.  The problem is, well known and the use of parameters with substantial uncer-
tainty is thus circumvented by sensitivity analyses in which the economic results of 
their variability are investigated. 
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As the selectivity parameters are recorded at trip level, linking selectivity changes to 
fishing mortality rates should in principle occur at the same level and not to the ag-
gregate fishing mortality rates and harvest used in the CBA formulas. The scaling 
would then be from the single vessel’s landings in a specific period and area to the 
entire fleet’s landings in the same period and area. Subsequently the scaling up would 
occur from that particular period and area to the whole year and all relevant areas. 
The level at which the former type of data are collated is indicated in Table 1.3.  
 
Tabel 1.3. 
 
 Data-rich Data-poor 
  
Fleet approach Vessel trip level: Number of days at sea, landings 
by species composition, area, period, prices 
Annual level: Number of vessels, number of trips, 
variable costs, fixed costs 
 
As for data-rich but less extensive
Fishery approach Trip level: Number of days at sea, landings by 
species composition, area, period, prices 
 
As for data-rich but less extensive
 
 
In the data-rich fleet approach much information is collected at vessel trip level. 
However, most of the economic information is collected at sampling level for the fleet 
on an annual basis. If costs are to be allocated at trip level it is necessary to construct 
an allocation procedure in which the cost-dependency on days-at-sea, landings etc. is 
specified. 
 
As indicated, there are several ways to address the scaling problem. The aim is to 
minimize the uncertainty of the economic results in terms of net present value for 
each of the scenarios so that the decision rule (Equations 4-5) will lead to an un-
equivocal answer. It is clear that the scaling problem may be difficult to overcome, 
and that a solution is to assess the sensitivity of the net present values to changes in 
parameter values. 
1.4. Conclusion 
The conclusion is that a fully integrated bio-economic cost-benefit analysis is very 
data demanding and difficult to configure. By its nature, the CBA is looking at the fu-
ture comparing a baseline situation and another where changes have taken place. Fu-
ture stock projections are encumbered with great uncertainty, as are technological 
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changes. Finally, the gear trials that form the bases for the CBA have, by nature, to be 
carried out in limited time and space.  
 
Given these comments about uncertainty, the application of cost-benefit analysis pro-
vides a useful insight not only on the overall benefit to society and private enterprises 
of carrying through different changes but also to which elements are critical in the 
aim to ensure a successful outcome. 
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 2. Willingness to pay for saving sea mammals 
2.1 Introduction 
In general, the optimal economic utilization of a marine resource depends on the 
stream of benefits that can be derived from the fishery compared to the stream of 
costs of harvesting over time. In traditional analyses, benefits only include direct 
benefits in the form of the market price of the landed fish, while costs only include 
the direct harvesting costs such as capital, effort and fuel. However, to derive an op-
timal social stock-harvest combination, other costs and benefits have to be included in 
the analysis. Examples are the damage done by fishing activity to the ecosystem and 
unintended death of non-target species among which can be sea mammals. The value 
of these costs can be incorporated in fisheries analysis, but a major problem is how to 
estimate the costs to the eco-system and the value of non-target species.  
 
Here, we will focus on the valuation of sea mammals as an unintended by-catch in 
fisheries. The value of sea mammals in this case flows mainly from the existence 
value that people attach to them, although there can be a recreational value (or option 
values) in that some persons will want to preserve the animals and the possibility of 
seeing them in their natural surroundings. The existence value can be assessed in two 
ways. People can be asked directly how much they are willing to pay (WTP) for a de-
crease in sea-mammal by-catch in fisheries. This is a stated preference method since 
respondents state a WTP without actually paying the amount. Another method is to 
see how demand for seafood products changes when they are labelled as sea-mammal 
safe. This is a revealed preference method in that the consumers through their actual 
choices in the market reveal their preferences.  
 
Unfortunately, not many studies exist that address the stated problem directly. Only in 
the case of tuna is there some evidence on consumer behaviour with respect to by-
catch of dolphins through the ’dolphin-safe’ labelling of canned tuna.  
2.2 Economic Valuation 
In economics, the value of a good stems from the utility people derive from the good. 
If the good is supplied through a market, people can express their WTP for the good 
by stating the maximum price they are prepared to offer for a certain quantity of the 
good. Doing this for several different quantities gives a demand function for the indi-
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vidual consumer. The total value of the good that the consumer actually buys is then 
given by the area under the demand function up to the quantity that he buys. The 
marginal WTP is given by the price since this is what the consumer would be willing 
to pay for an additional unit of the good. Hence, for market goods, A value can be es-
tablished by estimating the total demand function.  
 
The value of a good can be derived from several value categories. Direct use-value is 
what a consumer derives from using the good as an input to a process which trans-
forms it. This can be the use of apples for food, or the use of a tree for timber. Indirect 
use-value is derived from recreation or services the good provides. Examples are a 
walk through a forest, spotting whales or the pollution-cleansing capacity of natural 
wetlands. Besides use-values, there also exist non-use values. Amongst these are exis-
tence value and bequest value. Existence value means that people value a good for its 
mere existence, without them ever using the good directly or indirectly. So, people 
value the existence of whales, even though they will never see one, let alone eat their 
meat. This holds for many wildlife resources. In general, people are willing to pay 
some amount to ensure the existence of certain biotopes and animals even though 
they will never visit them. Bequest value is related to this in that it gives the value to 
people for knowing that future generations will be able to enjoy the different goods.  
 
A major problem now is that private markets can capture direct use-value, and to 
some extent indirect use-value, but not non-use value. The reason for this is that non-
use value has the character of a public good. This means that if the good is provided 
to one person, the good is available in the same quantity to all people. So, if someone 
ensures that there is a viable population of gray whales, then others, who would like 
the gray whale to be in existence, derive value from this too, without having to pay 
for it. This is rather different from a private good, where utility only comes from di-
rect consumption. Hence, the fact that I eat an apple does not give higher utility to 
(most) others. The result is that markets will not supply public goods, since they will 
not be able to capture the cost of providing the good through the market, but from a 
societal point of view, public goods do give value and, hence, should be provided. 
The major problem then is to find out how much of the good should be provided. That 
is, we have to estimate the value of the good to society and compare that with the cost 
of supplying the good, but since markets for the good do not exist, data on its value 
are not available. 
 
Economists have developed several techniques to estimate the non-market value of 
goods. They can be divided in two main categories: stated preference methods and 
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revealed preference methods. In the latter method, market goods can be used in the 
valuation of non-market goods. For example, people pay to travel to national parks. 
The expense used for travelling to the park (including the value of time) then gives an 
estimate for the value of the park. Another method is known as the hedonic pricing 
method (HPM). Here, the value of a market good depends on the supply of a non-
market good. The method most used is the house price method. Houses are generally 
more expensive when they are located near a recreational site such as a forest. The 
main disadvantage of revealed preference methods is that they can only measure use-
values. Stated preference methods can measure both use and non-use values. With 
these methods respondents are asked, through a survey, about their willingness to pay. 
The survey can be open-ended or several amounts can be given from which the re-
spondents can choose. Another method is dichotomous choice, where one amount is 
mentioned, which the respondents can accept or reject. More advanced methods have 
been developed, such as choice experiments, where there are different surveys that 
state different attributes of the good and/or different prices.  
 
Both stated and revealed preference methods are not without problems, so that in gen-
eral, the estimates that are found in valuation studies are inexact measures of people’s 
willingness to pay. 
2.3 Environmental Valuation of Sea Mammals 
One method of estimating the economic value of sea mammals is through question-
naires. This method is known as the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). Basically, 
the respondent is asked to say how much he or she is willing to pay for the protection 
of a certain animal. This can be either stated as the WTP for an increase in the num-
bers of the species or as a WTP to avoid deterioration of the species. The question can 
be open ended, where respondents have to state the amount they are willing to pay, or 
dichotomous choice, where a value is stated in the survey and respondents can either 
accept to pay the amount or reject it. By varying the amount in the surveys, a demand 
function can be estimated. Another element is how the payment is to occur, either as a 
yearly amount or as a lump-sum amount. 
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Table 2.1. WTP per household (1993) for threatened and endangered species 
 
 -------- Willingness to pay --------
Survey Size Lump Annual Survey
d
 
ate Species Gain or loss of change sum 1993 2006 Region
1984 Gray-blue whale Avoid loss 100% $33.33 $45.83 CA households
 Sea otter Avoid loss 100% $28.88 $39.71
1991 Gray Whale Gain 50% $17.15 $23.58 CA households
 Gray Whale Gain 100% $19.23 $26.44 CA households
 Gray Whale Gain 50% $26.50 $36.44 CA visitors
 Gray Whale Gain 100% $31.51 $43.33 CA visitors
2000 Steller Sea Lion Gain $70.54 US households
1988 Monk Seal Avoid loss 100% $119.70 ($11.52) HI households
 Humpback Whale Avoid loss 100% $172.92 ($16.64)
1991 Sea Turtle Avoid loss 100% $ 12.99 ($1.25) NC households
 
Source: Loomis and White (1996), Giraud et al. (2002).  
Notes: The 2006 amounts were calculated using the consumer price index. Lump sum amounts are con-
verted to annual amounts using a 7% discount rate. CA=California, HI=Hawaii Islands, NC=North Carolina 
 
 
Some results from CVM surveys are reported in Table 2.1. The amounts in the Table 
give the willingness to pay per household, either as a payment per year, or as a single 
lump-sum payment. The Table shows that there is a willingness to pay for the preser-
vation or increase in size of threatened and endangered species, although the amounts 
vary between species. The WTP for the last three species mentioned in Table 2.1 are 
given as single payments. Converting these to annual payments gives a WTP of 
$8.38, $12.10 and $0.91 for the monk seal, the humpback whale and the sea turtle re-
spectively when using a discount rate of 7% (at 5% the numbers are $5.99, $8.65 and 
$0.65). Compared to the amounts stated for the other species, these amounts seem 
rather low. However, the differences may stem from a difference in the questions 
asked. For example, in the study on the humpback whale, respondents were asked for 
their WTP to provide one-time emergency assistance to protect whales in Hawaii 
(Samples and Hollyer 1990). The WTP to pay for the gray whale is given for both a 
50% and a 100% increase in the population and clearly shows a decreasing marginal 
WTP (Loomis and Larson 1994).  
 
A major problem with the studies mentioned above is that they give the total willing-
ness to pay for a certain level of sea mammal population or for the protection of the 
species. Hence, the amounts are only valid at that level and do not tell us anything 
about the WTP for other levels. Another problem arises when respondents are asked 
about their WTP for preservation of the species. In most cases, the respondent is not 
informed about the minimum viable population. The result is that the total WTP de-
rived from the study does not give an indication about the optimal species population. 
As Bulte and Van Kooten (1999) show for the minke whale, the same total WTP es-
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timates can be consistent not only with extinction, but also with strict conservation 
(i.e., no fishing) being optimal. To prevent such problems, one needs to elicit the 
marginal willingness to pay. The only case where it is possible to infer marginal WTP 
is in the study on gray whales by Loomis and Larson (1994). 
2.4 Eco-labelling 
Several forms of eco-labelling exist. Within Europe, several general eco-labels exist 
at the national level and one, the flower, at the EU level (see Pickering et al, 2001, 
App. 1, for an overview). These are aimed at products produced by environmentally 
friendly methods in general, and applied to seafood do not necessarily take by-catch 
of sea mammals into account. An eco-label especially targeting seafood is the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC) label. The MSC was created in 1996 by Unilever and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) to encourage responsible fishing practices that 
lead to sustainable fisheries. The MSC scheme builds on three key principles of sus-
tainability: 1) the target fish population should not be overexploited, 2) preservation 
of the ecosystem, and 3) operation of the fishery in accordance with local, national 
and international laws and standards.  
 
Even though sustainability labels aim at increasing the stock of the target species, 
they may have the opposite effect, depending on how the premium people are willing 
to pay varies with stock size and how well the fishery is managed (Gudmundsson and 
Wessells 2000) 
 
Other labels targeting seafood are the dolphin-safe label for canned tuna and the tur-
tle-safe label for shrimps. These labels target the by-catch in tuna and shrimp fisheries 
directly in that the labels can only be used on products that only have a small by-catch 
of dolphins or turtles.  
 
Pickering et al. (2001) give a stated preference analysis of eco-labeling of seafood. 
Respondents were asked for their willingness to pay for several seafood products that 
were given a sustainability label. The sustainability label refers to the Marine Stew-
ardship Council (MSC) scheme. The study attempts to determine consumer WTP by 
two methods: an open-ended CVM and a choice experiment. In the latter, respondents 
are presented with different product choices, considering various product attributes 
(type of fish, quality, eco-labelled or not) and a price. The respondents can then state 
whether the price is acceptable for that bundle or not. Results of the study with re-
spect to eco-labelling are given in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
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Table 2.2. WTP per household in the UK for products with a sustainability label 
 
Product 
Significant willingness
to pay premiums 
% (CVM)
Significant willingness 
to pay premiums 
% (CE)
Existing prices
at time of survey 
£ per kg
 
Fresh & chilled cod fillets +34% 4.70
Fresh & chilled salmon steaks +24% +87% 6.00
Smoked haddock fillets +20% −14% 7.00
Fish fingers +14% 4.20
Canned tuna +15% 3.00
Prawns −23% 9.30
 
Source: Pickering et al. (2001, p.3) 
 
 
The Tables show that in general, there is a positive WTP for eco-labelled seafood, 
with most premiums lying in the 15%-30% range. However, there are negative WTPs 
and very high WTP too. Furthermore, the Tables show that WTP premium varies with 
the type of seafood and between countries. The report also shows that eco-labelling 
may lead to an increase in purchase frequency of seafood.  
 
Table 2.3. WTP per household in Denmark for products with a sustainability label 
 
Product 
Significant willingness to 
pay premiums 
% (CVM)
Significant willingness to 
pay premiums 
% (CE)
Existing prices 
at time of survey 
DKK per kg
 
Fresh & chilled cod fillets −4% +28% 90.00
Fresh & chilled salmon steaks +22% 84.00
Smoked salmon fillets +31% 166.50
Frozen breaded plaice +14% 50.00
Canned mackerel +6% +141% 37.20
Shrimp −7% 159.70
 
 
In another study, Wessells et al. (1999) analyze several aspects that affect consumer 
preferences for eco-labelled seafood. These include which species is labelled, who is 
the certifier and several household attributes such as membership of an environmental 
organization and household income. They show that in general, consumers are willing 
to pay for eco-labelled seafood, but that their WTP is dependent on many variables. A 
conclusion that can be drawn is that eco-labelling must be accompanied by campaigns 
that inform the public about the fisheries and the eco-label. 
 
A problem with WTP through eco-labelling is that only the WTP from individuals 
buying the products is measured. However, persons not buying seafood may have a 
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WTP for a sustainable fishery. Hence, in general, WTP measured through eco-
labelling will give an under-estimation of the real WTP. However, eco-labelling can 
be used to capture some of the WTP for more sustainable fisheries.  
2.5 Dolphin-Safe Tuna.  
In the pacific, catches of yellowfin tuna have habitually been accompanied by a large 
by-catch of dolphins. The eco-label ’dolphin-safe tuna’ was introduced in the US to 
designate canned tuna associated with a much lower by-catch of dolphins. Now, vir-
tually all canned tuna in the US is dolphin-safe. Also, in other countries, the dolphin-
safe label has been introduced, even in cases where all canned tuna on the market al-
ready was dolphin-safe. Teisl et al. (2002) find that the dolphin-safe label increases 
demand for canned tuna in the USA relative to where no label is used. This should be 
seen against a background of declining sales of tuna in general. It cannot easily be de-
duced from this study how much demand increases and it is therefore hard to deter-
mine the WTP for dolphin-safe fisheries. 
2.6 Turtle-Safe Shrimp.  
In several areas, shrimp fisheries are associated with a substantial by-catch of sea tur-
tles. To counter this, the ’turtle-safe shrimp’ label has been introduced. To our knowl-
edge, no studies exist that assess the effect of this label on consumer behaviour. 
2.7 Conclusions 
It is clear that people attach a positive value to the existence of sea mammals. They 
are willing to pay substantial amounts to keep populations of several species at viable 
levels. This fact should be taken into account in fisheries policy. It implies that by-
catch of sea mammals represents a cost to society that should be treated on a par with 
other costs and benefits flowing from fisheries. Doing so means that by-catch of sea 
mammals should be reduced from their current levels. Such a reduction can be at-
tained through regulatory measures, especially gear specifications and perhaps fishing 
area restrictions. 
 
Eco-labelling can assist regulation, but cannot replace it entirely. With eco-labelling, 
the consumer can make a choice between products with a high or low by-catch of sea 
mammals. If consumers switch to products with low sea mammal by-catch this will 
force fishers and the seafood industry to reduce by-catch. Since sea mammal-safe fish 
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can fetch a higher price on the market, such eco-labels may then go some way to re-
covering the additional costs to the seafood industry. However, through eco-labelling, 
only consumers of seafood can express a WTP for sea mammal-safe fisheries. The 
preferences of people that do not consume seafood are thus not taken into account, 
and it is also likely that seafood consumers have a higher WTP than the additional 
price of seafood. Hence, the optimal level of by-catch of sea mammals for society 
could be lower than the level that will be reached when only eco-labelling is applied. 
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3. Management regimes 
The general principles of resource management of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) are laid down in Council Regulation 2371/2002 and the Road Map (European 
Commission 2002).  
 
There are three main elements in the resource management policy: 
 
1. Total Allowable Catches (TAC) and quotas 
2. Effort controls 
3. Technical measures  
a. Mesh size (panels, grids) (EU) 
b. Minimum landings sizes (EU) 
3.1 Total Allowable Catches and Quotas 
The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is the main supplier 
of fish stock assessments by the use of methods known as virtual population analyses 
(VPA and XSA). Based on various types of catch and landings information, catch per 
unit of effort (CPUE) information and surveys, it is possible to estimate the stock 
biomass by age (or length) groups by solving a large system of equations. For a num-
ber of fish species VPA is performed every year, and this forms the basis for the TAC 
recommendations put forward by ICES. The underlying information about stock size 
by age-groups is used in the CBA shown in Section 4. If this information were not 
available a full application of the model shown in Section 1 would not be possible. 
 
ICES does not carry out stock assessments (WKNEPH Report 2006) of the nephrops 
stocks  by use of VPA or XSA, as it is difficult to determine their age directly. Length 
compositions of the Nephrops stocks could be estimated from selectivity trials but this 
kind of information is not published by ICES. Stocks are assessed by use of CPUE 
indices and underwater surveys conducted by television. The proposed TACs are, 
therefore, generally determined by developments in historical landings. The general 
trend in the TAC has shown an increase for all the management areas, cf. Table 3.1. 
Compared with the CPUE information, nephrops do not seem to be overexploited. 
 
 
 
 
NECESSITY    FOI    35 
Table 3.1. EU TACs for Nephrops by management area, tonnes 
 
Area 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
IIIa,IIIbcd 4500 4500 4600 4700 5170
IIa,IV (EU zone) 16623 16623 18987 21350 28147
Vb,VI 11340 11340 11300 12700 17675
VII 17790 17790 17450 18596 21498
VIIIabde 3200 3000 3150 3100 4030
VIIIc 360 180 180 162 -
IX,X,CECAF 800 600 600 540 486
 
Source: The EIAA model  
 
 
The United Kingdom is by far the most important player with more than half of the 
total landings of nephrops, see Table 3.2. France, Ireland and Denmark come next.  
 
Table 3.2. EU TACs for Nephrops by Member State, average 2003-2005, tonnes 
 
Area BEL DNK DEU IRL ESP FRA NLD PRT SWE GBR Total
 
IIIa,IIIbcd 3381 10 1210 4600
IIa,IV (EU zone) 993 993 12 31 512 16445 18987
Vb,VI 159 23 93 11504 11780
VII 6620 1077 4361 5887 17945
VIIIabde 0 185 2898 3083
VIIIc 0 167 7 174
IX,X,CECAF 145 435 580
 
Total 993 4374 22 6779 1597 7392 512 435 1210 33836 57149
 
Source: The EIAA model 
 
 
There is a clear regional difference as to where the landings of each country originate 
as shown in the left column of Table 3.2. Area III is the Skagerrak, Kattegat and 
southern Baltic Sea, Areas II and IV comprise the North Sea. The area codes then 
move south through the English Channel, the seas around Ireland and down to the 
west coast of Spain and Portugal (Areas IX and X). 
3.2  Effort management 
Effort management has taken place on two levels; namely, by vessel capacity restric-
tions and by days-at-sea limitation.  Since 2003, restrictions on vessels have been re-
inforced by the revision of the CFP. However, this type of restriction is not suffi-
ciently directed towards protection of individual fish stocks. As a consequence, days-
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at-sea limitations were introduced on 1st February 2003, see Table 3.3, with the aim 
of allowing stocks, cod in particular, to recover.  
 
Table 3.3. Maximum days per month present within an area and absent from port 
by fishing gear in the Skagerrak, Kattegat, North Sea, Eastern Channel, 
West of Scotland and Irish Sea 
 
Gear Mesh size 2003 2004 2005
 
Demersal trawls, seines or similar towed gears except beam trawl ≥ 100mm1 9 10 (+33) 9 (+33)
Beam trawl ≥ 80mm 15 14 13
Static demersal nets including gill-nets, trammel nets and  
tangle nets 16 14 13
Demersal longlines 19 17 16
Demersal trawls, seines or similar towed gears except beam trawl 70 – 99mm2 25 22 21
Demersal trawls, seines or similar towed gears except beam trawl 16 – 31mm 23 20 19
 
1. Kattegat and Skagerrak 90mm 
2. Kattegat and Skagerrak 70 – 90mm with grid and square-mesh cod-end 
3. Extra days to Denmark because of reduction in number of vessels 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No. 2341/2002 OJ L 356 of 31/12/2002; Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2287/2003 OJ L 344 of 31/12/2003; Council Regulation (EC) No. 27/2005 OJ L 12 of 14/1/2005.  
3.3 Technical restrictions 
Restrictions on days at sea, however, influence the level of catches of nephrops. Since 
1st March 2004, for example, a regulation has applied in the Skagerrak and Kattegat 
that fishing with towed gear with meshes of 70mm to 89mm is permitted only if 
square meshes are used in the cod-end and extension. This rule is directed towards the 
nephrops fishery, see Table 3.4. Directed fishing for most demersal species using 
these mesh sizes is prohibited. Since 1st January 2005, the rule has been reinforced so 
that these mesh sizes are allowed only if a sorting grid and square-mesh panel in the 
cod-end and extension are used. 
 
The consequence has been that this mesh size has been abandoned by the fishermen. 
Now they almost all use 90mm mesh and above, which allows them to target all spe-
cies in the Skagerrak and Kattegat freely. They are granted extra days at sea in these 
waters if they use a mesh of 120mm and above.  
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Table 3.4. Mesh sizes for trawl, target species 
Specific gear (mesh size) is only allowed for targeting the species 
marked X, i.e. the smaller the mesh size the fewer the number of target 
species allowed. 
 
 Region 1 and 2 except Kattegat and Skagerrak Kattegat and Skagerrak(6) 
Mesh size in mm  
for trawl <16 16-31 32-54
55-
69
70-
79 80-99
>=
100 <16 16-31 32-69 70-89
>=
90
Minimum per-
centage of target  
species 95
90/
60
(3,5) 60 30
90/
60 
(4) 90 35 30 70 none 50 50 20 50 20 50 30
non
e
 
Sandeel (1,2) X X   X  X X X X X X X X X X X X
Norway pout  X  X  X X X X  X X X X X X
Sprat  X  X  X X X X  X X X X X X
Blue whiting  X  X  X X X X  X X X X X X
Sardine  X  X  X X X X  - - - - - -
Brown shrimp   X X X  X X X X   X X X X X X
Mackerel  ø  X X X X X X   X X X X
Horse mackerel    X  X X X X   X X X X
Herring    X  X X X X   X X X X
Prawn   ø X X X  X X X X     X X X X
Norway lobster  ø   æ  X X X X       X X
Sole  ø  æ    X X      X
Plaice  ø  æ    X X      X
Dab  ø  æ    X X      X
Lemon sole  ø  æ    X X      X
Witch  ø  æ    X X      X
Flounder  ø  æ    X X      X
Turbot  ø  æ    X X      X
Megrim  ø  æ    X X      X
Brill  ø  æ    X X      X
Pollock  ø  æ    X X      X
Whiting  ø  æ    X X     X X
Hake  ø   æ    X X        X
Cod       X      X
Saithe       X      X
Haddock       X      X
Ling          X        X
 
1. <16mm mesh is allowed only part of the year (March till October incl) in the North Sea and Skagerrak; 
March till July (incl) in the Kattegat.  
2. Outside the period indicated in 1. only using mesh at 16mm or above.  
3. Catch on board at least 90% of two or more target species (marked X), or at least 60% of one target spe-
cies and less than 5% of mixed cod, haddock, saithe and less than 15% of species marked ø.  
4. Catch on board at least 90% of two or more target species (marked X), or at least 60% of one target spe-
cies and less than 5% of mixed cod, haddock, saithe and less than 15% of species marked æ.  
5. Specific rules for herring. 
6. From 1st January 2005, in the Kattegat and Skagerrak trawl meshes between 70 and 89mm are allowed 
only with a square-mesh panel.  Extra days at sea granted in 2005 if the trawl used has 120mm square-mesh 
sorting window.   
Source: Council Regulation (EC) no. 850/98, OJ L. 125 of 27/4/1998, Annex I and IV. 
 
 
The permitted minimum landing size of fish is shown in Table 3.5. All fish below the 
minimum must be put back into the sea. It is not prohibited to catch fish below these 
sizes but they must not be retained on board. Usually the discarded catch is dead 
when returned to the sea.  
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Tabel 3.5 Permitted Minimum Landing Sizes for fish 
 
 ------ North Sea ----- Skagerrak and Kattegat Baltic Sea, Sound and Belt
 DK EU DK EU DK EU
 cm cm Cm cm cm cm
 
Sandeel (1,2)    
Norway pout    
Sprat    
Blue whiting    
Sardine    
Brown shrimp    
Mackerel 30 20  
Horse mackerel 15   
Herring 20 18  
Prawn     
Norway lobster 13 8,5 13 13 13 13
Sole 24,5 24 24,5 24 24,5  
Plaice 27 22 27 27 27 25
Dab 25 23 25 23 25  
Lemon sole 26 25 26 25 26  
Witch 28 28  
Flounder 25,5 25 25,5 20 25,5 25
Turbot 30 30 30 30 30 30
Megrim 25 25  
Brill 30 30 30 30 30 30
Pollock 30   
Whiting 23 23  
Hake 40 30 40 30 40  
Cod 40 35 40/35 30 35 35
Saithe 40 35 40 30 40  
Haddock 32 30 32 27 35  
Ling 63   
 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) no. 850/98, OJ L. 125 of 27/4/1998, Annex  XII 
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References: 
European Commission (2002) Communication from the Commission on the Reform of 
the Common Fisheries Policy, Roadmap, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg.  
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/fisheries/reform/proposals_en.htm. 
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4.  Case studies  
The model developed in Section 1 has been applied to a number of selectivity trials. 
The trials planned at the commencement of the project are listed in Table 4.0. Some 
of the trials concern nephrops and by-catches of demersal fish species. Some cover 
pelagic trawling and the opportunities to avoid by-catches of cetaceans (dolphins and 
porpoises) by using various devices fitted to the trawl. 
 
Cases have been selected within each ICES area. Three cases have been selected 
within the nephrops fisheries. Some of them are data-rich while others are more data-
poor. Pelagic trawling is the more difficult to analyse because these fisheries are 
rather data-poor with respect to both biological and economic information. The selec-
tion of cases has also been affected by the outcome of the trials, which was impossi-
ble to predict in advance.  
 
A number of species are subject to stock assessments. Officially published data from 
ICES are used. In general, no assessment is published for nephrops in terms of age or 
length composition. For cod, haddock, whiting, hake and plaice, information is pub-
lished. Stock assessments in terms of age composition, fishing mortality rates, and 
natural mortality are used as inputs in the stock projections that form a basis for the 
estimates of future landings in the baseline case and those with gear changes. Table 
4.1 indicates areas for which stock assessment is available for all or some of the spe-
cies.  
 
The case studies have been accomplished through a procedure generally along the fol-
lowing lines: 
1. General presentation in terms of landings of the fishery covering the trial 
2. Fleets costs and earnings 
a. Landings composition (to select segments if possible) 
b. Economic performance (to form the baseline and to calibrate the CBA 
model) 
3. Calculations and results (model, assumptions, results) arising from full appli-
cation of the model require: 
a. Projection of landings of various species per fleet segment over between 
10 and 30 years based on fish stock assessments, 
b. Projection of the costs of fleet segments over a period of 10 to 30 years 
consistent with 3a. 
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The purpose of this procedure is to draw a picture of the fisheries that are subject to 
the differing technical gear changes. Irrespective of whether full information is avail-
able, for example, about stock developments, the presentation of economic perform-
ance of the relevant fleet segments provides valuable information about the ability to 
incorporate such changes with respect to economic performance.  
 
Table 4.0. Summary of proposed experiments by area, species, modification and 
method 
 
Task 
No. 
ICES 
Area Fishery
By-catch 
Species Gear type Modification Method
Stock 
assess.
 
3.2 IVa Fladens Cod/Haddock/
Whiting
Nephrops trawl Inclined separator 
panel
Twin Trawl Yes
3.3 IIIa Skagerrak Cod Nephrops trawl Large mesh
escape panels
Twin Trawl Yes
3.4 IIIa Skagerrak Cod Nephrops trawl Grid Twin Trawl Yes
3.5 VIIb, VIa Aran, Clyde Cod/Haddock/
Whiting/Hake
Nephrops trawl Large mesh es-
cape panels with 
grid
Twin Trawl Yes
3.6 IVb Farne Cod/Haddock/
Whiting
Nephrops trawl Rigid grid/net 
grid/ cut-away 
trawl
Twin Trawl Yes
3.7 IVb,c Botney Gut Cod/Haddock/
Whiting
Nephrops
beam trawl
Lowered head-
line, square-mesh 
panel
Twin Beam Yes
3.8 VIIg Irish Sea 
(Smalls)
Hake/
Whi-
ting/Haddock
Nephrops trawl Cut-away upper 
panel/
inclined panel
Twin Trawl Yes
3.10 VIII Bay of Biscay Hake Nephrops trawl Flexible grids Twin Trawl
3.11 VIII Bay of Biscay Hake Nephrops trawl Side escape pa-
nels
Twin Trawl  
3.12 Med. Western Med Hake/Blue 
Whiting
Bottom otter
trawl**
Square-mesh 
panels and grids
Cover  
3.13 Med. Adriatic Hake Bottom trawl** Extension with 
square-mesh 
window
Separate 
covers 
 
3.14 Med. Aegean Hake Crustacea 
trawl**
Square-mesh pa-
nels
Separate 
covers 
 
3.15 IXa Algarve Blue Whiting Crustacea 
trawl**
Square-mesh pa-
nels
Small mesh 
covers
 
3.16 IXa Algarve Blue Whiting/
Boarfish
Crustacea 
trawl**
Grids Small mesh 
covers
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Table 4.0. cont. Pelagic trawl: Fishery and mitigation methods for cetaceans 
 
Fishery Proposed Tests 
 
PTM, Testing plastic + metal grid 
PTM, Test rope devices 
PTM, Cod-end closure (IFREMER) 
Bass VIIe,f + 
VIIIa,b 
PTM, Test grid 
PTM, Behaviour studies using pods and video footage + gear noise measurements  
(BIM+USTAN) 
PTM, Testing interactive deterrents (sub-contracted development by AquaTec Subsea) 
Test of excluder devices 
Albacore VII + VIII 
Test of codend closure (IFREMER+BIM) 
OTM, Tests with excluder section or square-mesh grid mackerel and horse  
mackerel + tests of interactive pingers in OTM + PTM fisheries (RIVO+BIM) 
Herring, Mackerel, 
Horse Mackerel 
VIIe,f,g + VIIIb,c OTM, Test interactive acoustic devices in the horse mackerel fishery in  
English Channel (DIFRES+BIM) 
Hake, VIII PTB, Testing excluder devices or noise deterrents 
  
Gear type Topics 
OTM Tests with excluder section or square-mesh grid, mackerel and  
horse mackerel OTM fisheries 
 Test on alternative tactics (discard storage onboard) 
OTM Test acoustic devices in the horse mackerel fishery in Channel 
 Testing excluder devices (plastic grid + rope devices (Xd) in bass fishery,  
and albacore fisheries) 
 Behaviour of cetaceans around trawls using pods 
 Testing interactive (or white noise) deterrents  
(sub-contracted development by AquaTec Subsea) 
 Testing acoustics (+excluder devices) in mackerel fishery 
PTM Sea Bass PTM, cod-end closure + grid 
PTM Tuna PTM, cod-end closure + grid 
 Testing excluder devices 
 
OTM: Midwater Otter Trawl, or single boat pelagic trawl 
PTM: Midwater Pair Trawl 
PTB: Bottom Pair Trawl (high vertical opening) 
 
 
The following map 4.0 of management areas for nephrops shows where the trials 
have taken place.  
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Map 4.0. Management areas for Nephrops 
  
Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2006, Figure 3.1.1 
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4.1. The North Sea, Kattegat and Skagerrak 
The trials concerning nephrops caught in the Skagerrak, Kattegat and the North Sea 
Fladen Ground are shown in Table 4.0.  
 
The case under consideration comprises the Kattegat and Skagerrak because the gear 
trials were carried out together. The North Sea case failed to produce applicable re-
sults for an economic analysis. 
4.1.1. Landings 
 
4.1.1.1. Skagerrak 
Landings of nephrops from the Skagerrak have fluctuated around 4,000 tonnes over 
the last two decades with no clear trend, see Figure 4.1.1. The composition of land-
ings by country has been stable over the years with Denmark landing, on average, 
71%, Sweden 26% and Norway 3%. Germany and the Netherlands have recorded less 
than 1% of landings. 
 
Figure 4.1.1.  Nominal landings (tonnes) of Nephrops in the Kattegat and Skager-
 rak (Division IIIa),  1986-2004 as officially reported to ICES 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.3 
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No stock assessment in terms of VPA is carried out for nephrops by ICES. Instead 
CPEU and landings per unit of effort (LPUE) in terms of catches and landings per 
hour trawling (Sweden) and per day trawling (Denmark) are extracted from logbooks, 
see Figure 4.1.2. The landings ratio of the catches for Swedish vessels varies between 
50% and 70% with an average of 62% for the whole period. There is no significant 
difference between single trawl and twin trawl. Hence, the discard rate in terms of 
weight is estimated at an annual average of 38%. 
 
While all the Norwegian landings are recorded as from the Skagerrak, only 59% of 
Danish landings and 64% of Swedish landings have come from that source. In this 
respect, Denmark and Sweden show a similar pattern. 
 
The LPUEs indicate no problems of overexploitation. They have shown no clear 
downward trend; quite the contrary for Swedish trawlers. Single trawl shows a slight 
rising trend while twin trawl has been rather stable. The Danish figures show a strong 
upward trend until 1998, then a fall to around 120kg per day where landings seem to 
have stabilised over the last few years. 
 
ICES considers the Swedish data more reliable than the Danish. However, LPUE and 
CPUE data cannot take technological improvement and changes in regulations fully 
into account. Despite that, the general picture is that the nephrops stock in the Kat-
tegat and Skagerrak (Division IIIa) is not overexploited, although it suffers from sub-
stantial discarding problems.  
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Figure 4.1.2 Nephrops in the Skagerrak (Functional Unit 3); CPUE and LPUE of 
Swedish and Danish Nephrops trawlers (per hour trawling for Sweden 
and per day trawling for Denmark) 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.7 and 14.8 
 
 
4.1.1.2. The North Sea 
Scotland, part of the UK, is by far the most important player in the North Sea with 
landings in recent years at around 10,000 tonnes. This is, on average, two-thirds of the 
landings over the last decade. England and Denmark are of almost equal importance 
with around 2,000 tonnes each (around 25% combined), while the final 8% is taken 
by eight different countries with the Netherlands and Belgium as the most important 
in that group.  
 
Scottish landings have doubled over the last twenty years, while the Danish have 
quadrupled and English landings have been stable, see Figure 4.1.3. 
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Figure 4.1.3. Nominal landings (tonnes) of Nephrops in Division IV, 1986-2004 as of-
ficially reported to ICES 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.14  
 
 
4.1.1.2.1. The Fladen Ground 
Landings of nephrops from the Fladen Ground have increased substantially over the 
last two decades almost entirely due to increased Scottish landings from that area, see 
Figure 4.1.4. The Scottish landings increased from around 400 tonnes in the begin-
ning of the 1980s to around 8,000 tonnes in recent years. This means that most of the 
recorded increase in Scottish landings of nephrops has taken place from the Fladen 
Ground. 
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 Figure 4.1.4. Landings from the Fladen Ground (right hand axis) and the share of 
the total landings from the North Sea (left hand axis) 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.14 and 14.26  
 
 
Stock assessment relies on the LPUE for the Fladen Ground. Hence, the Scottish fig-
ures are particularly important because of the developments in that fishery, see Figure 
4.1.5. Disregarding the final two years, landings per hour trawling average 37kg with 
a standard deviation at around 5kg. Single rig and multi-rig have shown similar ten-
dencies. The Danish figures are based on much smaller landings and effort, and show 
substantial variation. The main conclusion, however, seems to be that the stock is not 
overexploited. 
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Figure 4.1.5. Nephrops from the Fladen Ground (Functional Unit 7): LPUE (kg/hours 
trawling of Scottish Nephrops trawlers and kg/days trawling of Danish 
trawlers) 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.27 and 14.28 
 
 
4.1.1.2.2. Botney Gut and Silver Pit 
The landings recorded from Botney Gut and Silver Pit constitute around 1000 tonnes 
in total. The Netherlands accounts for around two-thirds of that, see Figure 4.1.6. 
Over the last decade, Dutch and British landings have expanded while Belgium has 
suffered a decline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50    FOI    NECESSITY 
Figure 4.1.6. Nephrops Botney Gut and Silver Pit (Functional Unit 5): landings (ton-
nes) by country, 1991-2004 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.47 
 
 
Landings per unit effort (LPUE) are reported by ICES for Belgian and Danish vessels 
for Botney Gut, see Figure 4.1.7. 
 
Figure 4.1.7. Botney Gut - Silver Pit (Functional Unit 5): Landings (tonnes), effort 
(000hours trawling and LPUE (kg/hours trawling) of Belgian Nephrops 
trawlers, 1991-2004 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2005, Table 14.48 and 14.49 
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4.1.2.  Fleets, costs and earnings. 
 
4.1.2.1  Landings composition 
For the Cost-Benefit calculations, it is important to know the catch composition, pref-
erably in each individual haul. Such information is not readily available. From aggre-
gate information published in the Annual Economic Report (AER) some information 
can be derived. From an economic point of view, only landings count, while discards, 
to a lesser extent, only affect costs of fishing. Because of the regulations, nephrops 
were caught in directed fisheries using 70mm mesh size or above, together with a 
number of other species for which landings are allowed. In the baseline period for the 
calculation, 2002 to 2004, a directed fishery for nephrops using 70 to 100mm in the 
North Sea and 70 to 90mm in the Kattegat and Skagerrak has taken place at certain 
times while larger meshes have been used in other periods in fishing directed towards 
cod, haddock and saithe, etc.  
 
Information available at the trip level shows a landing composition broadly dispersed 
across nephrops, members of the cod family, and flatfish. With the changes in the 
rules from 2005 fishermen have abandoned smaller mesh sizes and use 100mm 
(90mm) or above. This change removes restrictions on them in terms of target spe-
cies.  
   
The importance of nephrops for Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom is shown 
in table 4.1.1 extracted from the AER. Nephrops are important in all countries with 
10%, 8% and 12% respectively, measured in value in the baseline period, 2002 to 
2004. 
 
In the Danish case, no single fleet segment is particularly dependent on nephrops as 
identified in the statistics in the AER. The 24 to 40m trawler segment targets neph-
rops mainly in the North Sea and Skagerrak. 
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Table 4.1.1 Share of Nephrops of total landings 
 
 Value Volume 
 Average 2002 to 2004 Average 2002 to 2004
 
Denmark: National fleet, 10.2% 0.4%
Denmark: Trawlers 24 - < 40 m 11.5% 0.3%
Denmark: Trawlers < 24 m 30.2% 2.5%
Sweden: National fleet,  7.9% 0.3%
Sweden: Nephrops trawlers 66.6% 37.7%
Sweden: Cod trawlers < 24 m 7.9% 1.8%
United Kingdom: National fleet 12.5% 4.5%
UK: Northern Irish Nephrops trawlers 74.5%
UK Scottish Nephrops trawlers 61.8%
UK: Scottish demersal trawlers < 24 m 25.0%
 
Source:  AER 
 
 
For the two Danish trawler segments, the industrial fishery (for fish-meal and -oil) is 
conducted in a way that does not affect nephrops. The inclusion of the industrial fish-
ery in the data presented in Table 4.1.1 shows, however, the importance of the indus-
trial fishery for the Danish trawlers. Other fish are herring and mackerel, and a large 
number of species for which no stock information exists. nephrops are targeted to-
gether with roundfish and flatfish. 
 
A problem regarding the aggregate data available is that discards of over- and under-
sized fish and fish that have contact with the gear in the water but escape, are poorly 
covered if covered at all. The calculations which follow disregard these problems i.e. 
the calculations are based on information covering age-groups one and above. The 
gear impact on age-group zero is disregarded. Therefore, an implicit assumption is 
that no changes in the zero age-group occur as a consequence of the gear change. 
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4.1.2.2. Economic performance of fleets, dependent on Nephrops 
From the AER, seven fleet segments particularly dependent on nephrops from Den-
mark, Sweden and the United Kingdom are identified and key economic indicators 
for these segments are presented in Table 4.1.2 for Denmark, the segments are chosen 
according to length, while for Sweden and the UK the length groups have been fur-
ther subdivided according to the most important species in the landings composition. 
 
Table 4.1.2. Main economic indicators for fleet segments particularly dependent on 
Nephrops 
 
  
Value of 
landings Crew share
Gross 
cash flow Net profit
Gross value-
added
 
Denmark 
Trawlers 24 - < 40 m  74 27 4 -21 31
Trawlers < 24 m 81 42 -1 -17 41
Sweden 
Nephrops trawlers 6 2 0 0 2
Cod trawlers < 24 m 14 3 3 3 0
United Kingdom 
Scottish/N. Irish Nephrops trawlers 14 2 1 0 3
Scottish Nephrops trawlers 66 12 5 -4 17
Scottish demersal trawlers<24m 61 15 16 1 -10
 
 
Tabel 4.1.2.. Cont... 
  
  
Employment 
on 
board (FTE)
Invested
capital
(€m)
Effort (000 
days at 
sea)
Volume of 
landings 
(000t)
Fleet -
number of 
vessels
Fleet – 
total kW 
(000) 
  
Denmark  
Trawlers 24 - < 40 m  633 147 26 368 118 70 
Trawlers < 24 m 988 115 63 136 370 82 
Sweden  
Nephrops trawlers 114 14 9 1 67 15 
Cod trawlers < 24 m 178 40 10 9 74 23 
United Kingdom  
Scottish/N. Irish Nephrops trawlers 312 12 15 7 89 20 
Scottish Nephrops trawlers 961 83 43 14 289 44 
Scottish demersal trawlers<24m 850 108 34 32 181 54 
 
Source: AER 
 
 
Nephrops constitutes around 10% of the total value of Danish landings, and the two 
selected fleet segments take around 95% of these. In Sweden, nephrops constitute a 
little less than 10% of the total value of landings with a declining trend. The two se-
lected fleet segments take around 75% of the Swedish total. In the United Kingdom 
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nephrops constitutes around 13% of the total value of landings, while the three se-
lected fleet segments take around 75% of them.   
 
Further incomplete information is available for two segments, one from France using 
pots and one from Ireland using trawl. 
4.1.3. CBA projections and results 
The cases investigated are one with a 90mm mesh size and one with a 90mm mesh 
including a 120mm window in the upper part of the cod-end of the trawl. The design 
of the trawl and the placing of the panel are intended to be neutral with respect to 
nephrops i.e. no changes in selectivity or catches are assumed for this species. Fur-
ther, it is assumed that landings of all other species except cod and plaice (as well as 
nephrops) are constant. This latter assumption is made because of lack of data for 
other species, either with respect to published stock assessments from ICES or selec-
tivity information from the trials. 
 
The cost-benefit model applied to these cases is the most extensive version including 
the economics and stock dynamics. The base year is chosen to be 2003 to dovetail the 
economics and the biological assessments published in ICES reports, in a year in 
which gear changes in term of panels or windows had not yet been implemented. 
 
The Danish fleet of trawlers below 24m in length has been subdivided into three to 
make a total of four segments. Danish vessels below 12m and above 40m in length do 
not target nephrops. For these segments, costs and earnings data are available and are 
shown in Table 4.1.3. The value of landings comprises all species caught. The vari-
able costs comprise fuel, ice, provisions, landing and sales costs. The gross margin is 
calculated as the difference between landings and variable costs, and this measure 
forms the basis for the net present value calculated in the cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Table 4.1.3.  Costs and earnings for Danish vessels at vessel level, Base year 2003, 
€000    
 
Length Landings value Variable costs* Gross margin Labour costs Margin**
 
12-15m 144 65 79 89 -10
15-18m 213 100 113 111 2
18-24m 404 191 213 186 27
24-40m 691 374 317 253 64
 
* Before remuneration of labour and capital  
** Before remuneration of capital 
Source: Costs and earnings statistics, Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
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Total landings and the shares of nephrops, cod and plaice are shown in Table 4.1.4 for 
these segments. Note that nephrops, cod, and plaice are less important in terms of 
weight while they are very important in terms of value, not least for the smaller ves-
sels. This picture is influenced by the fishery for industrial species that is prosecuted 
by the larger vessels as part of their yearly fishing pattern. Other important species in 
the catch composition are sole, anglerfish and haddock. There are no recorded selec-
tivity measures for these species, however, from the trials. Therefore, they are omitted 
from Table 4.1.4 and included in the group “other species”. 
  
The figures are averages covering all trawl types and different mesh sizes. The land-
ings composition reached by use of 70 to 90mm meshes is different from the landings 
composition for mesh sizes above 90mm. Therefore, vessels using different mesh 
sizes for most of the year are affected differently. This path, however, is not pursued 
here.   
 
The unit prices shown in Table 4.1.4 are further disaggregated (see Table 4.1.7) with 
the purpose of including the price effects emanating from changes in catch composi-
tions as a result of gear changes. 
 
Table 4.1.4. Landings composition for Danish vessels, Base year 2003 
 
Weight      
F
 
leet segment Length Nephrops Plaice Cod Other species Total (tonnes)
12-15m 13% 7% 20% 60% 6,478
15-18m 4% 3% 12% 81% 23,650
18-24m 3% 5% 7% 85% 44,996
24-40m 3% 5% 3% 89% 33,559
 
Value 
Fleet segment Length Nephrops Plaice Cod Other species Total (€000 )
 
12-15m Total 52% 8% 22% 17% 11,258
15-18m Total 38% 7% 25% 29% 19,615
18-24m Total 30% 12% 17% 41% 34,426
24-40m Total 25% 8% 9% 58% 38,181
 
Unit price in € 
Fleet segment Length Nephrops Plaice Cod Other species  
 
12-15m Total 7.17 1.94 1.96 0.50
15-18m Total 7.29 2.06 1.77 0.30
18-24m Total 7.08 1.84 1.87 0.37
24-40m Total 10.65 1.98 3.10 0.74
 
Source: The Danish Fisheries Directorate, The DFAD database, Vessels with landings of nephrops from the 
Kattegat or Skagerrak. 
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To apply the selectivity model, shown in Equations (5) to (10) above, as part of the 
CBA, a series of biological data are required of stock composition by age-groups in 
the base year, natural mortality, fishing mortality, length and weight of the fish. The 
data used are extracted from ICES reports (ICES WGBFAS 2006 for cod, and ICES 
WGNSSK 2005 for plaice), see table 4.1.5.  
 
Recruitment for cod is taken as the average recruitment from 1980 to 2004 at age one, 
which is 9.864 million with a maximum at 20.984m and a minimum at 0.894m. Natu-
ral mortality for all age-groups is 0.2. 
 
Recruitment for plaice is taken as the average recruitment from 1978 to 2004 at age 
two, which is 51.008m. Estimated maximum recruitment was 134.6m and the mini-
mum 25.7m.  Natural mortality for all age-groups is 0.1. 
 
As noted earlier, this type of information does not allow us to account for what hap-
pens to the fish that have gear contact but are not brought on board. Nor is the impact 
of discarding under- and oversized fish included. These issues could be dealt with in 
sensitivity analyses and qualitative statements concerning in which direction the net 
present value will move.  
 
Table 4.1.5 Starting parameters (2003) to the biological projection model for the 
Kattegat and Skagerrak 
 Cod Plaice
 Age-group 
Fishing 
mortality 
at age
Stock num-
bers at age 
(thousands)
Weight at age
(kg) in the
catches
Fishing 
mortality 
at age
Stock num-
bers at age 
(thousands)
Weight at age 
(kg) in the 
catches
 
1 0 894 0.55
2 0.361 3100 0.7 0.0276 134646 0.243
3 0.9817 991 1.37 0.1732 30982 0.252
4 1.0569 305 2.46 0.3534 32129 0.271
5 0.8941 120 3.75 1.1027 14602 0.29
6 0.5172 33 5.92 2.4976 4960 0.298
7 0.8094 8 7.84 2.0876 1163 0.4
8(+) 0.8094 0 10.89 2.0653 166 0.464
9 0.7004 40 0.605
10 1.4661 15 0.642
11(+) 1.4661 7 1.29
 
Note: 8(+) and 11(+) contains values for age 8 and 11 onwards for cod and plaice respectively 
 
 
As the gear selectivity is a function of the length of the fish while the available infor-
mation is on weight of the fish (cf. Table 4.1.5), a transformation from weight to 
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length is accomplished by use of Equation (7). Table 4.1.6 contains information about 
parameters to Equation (7), and 
w = c*a*lb, 
where w is round (live) weight and c is the adjustment parameter from gutted to round 
weight. The parameters are estimated for the North Sea and are used for the Kattegat 
and Skagerrak because of lack of information from those areas. 
 
Table 4.1.6 Estimated weight to length parameters for North Sea cod and plaice 
 
 
 
Cod Plaice
a 0.0175 0.0215
b 2.8571 2.7901
c 1.17 1.07
 
Source: Coull, K.A., A.S. Jermyn, A.W. Newton, G.I. Henderson, and W.B. Hall (1989) 
 
 
Prices recorded in Table 4.1.4 are average prices for all size (and age) groups. The 
average price will, however, change once the size composition in the landings 
changes. To capture this effect the model applied is an age-structured model. Re-
corded prices are published according to grade and quality. Here, quality differences 
are disregarded. The average weight of the fish in each grade is known, and, based on 
the average weight in each age-group, prices are transformed to price by age-group. 
Prices according to size grade are shown in Table 4.1.7. 
 
Table 4.1.7 Prices of cod and plaice according to grade, 2003 
 
 ------------------------- Cod --------------------------- ------------------------- Plaice ---------------------
 
Grade Kg per fish € per kg Relative Price Kg per fish € per kg Relative Price
1 >=7 4.60 2.33 >= 0.6 2.28 1.19
2 4-7 3.48 1.76 0.4-0.6 2.15 1.12
3 2-4 2.85 1.44 0.3-0.4 2.08 1.08
4 1-2 1.97 1.00 0.15-0.3 1.92 1.00
5 0.3-1 1.51 0.76  
 
Source: Danish Fisheries Directorate and Council Regulation (EC) No 2406/96 of 26 November 1996 laying 
down common marketing standards for certain fishery products. 
 
 
The majority of landings, around 70%, are recorded as Size Grades 4 and 5 for cod, 
and as Grade 4 for plaice, representing around 50% of landings by weight. The price 
differences between grades are quite substantial as shown in Table 4.1.7. For cod, 
Grade 1 received 2.33 times the price per tonne of Grade 4. For plaice, the difference 
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is smaller. It also varies over time. It is therefore to be expected that lowering the fish-
ing mortality on the younger age-groups will result in substantial price effects.  
 
In Table 4.1.8 the prices applied are shown according to age-group, weight and 
length. It should be noted that the minimum landing size in Demark for cod from the 
North Sea and the Skagerrak is 40cm and 35cm from the Kattegat, while the EU 
minimum size is 35cm and 30cm respectively, see Table 3.5. For plaice the minimum 
landings size in Denmark is 27cm in the North Sea, Kattegat and Skagerrak, while the 
EU minimum is set at 22cm for the North Sea.  
 
Table 4.1.8 Prices transformed from size grade to age-group, weight and length, 
2003 
       
 ----------------------- Cod ------------------------ --------------------------- Plaice --------------------
Age-group Weight (kg) € per kg Length (cm) Weight (kg) € per kg Length (cm)
 
1 0.55 1.50 35    
2 0.7 1.50 39 0.243 1.6 28
3 1.37 1.97 49 0.252 1.6 28
4 2.46 2.84 60 0.271 1.6 29
5 3.75 2.84 70 0.29 1.6 29
6 5.92 3.47 82 0.298 1.9 30
7 7.84 4.59 90 0.4 2.3 33
8 (+) 10.89 4.59 101 0.464 2.3 35
9 0.605 2.4 38
10 0.642 2.4 39
11(+) 1.29 2.4 50
 
 
With reference to Table 4.1.8 under the Danish national regulations no cod in age-
groups 1 and above must be discarded, and none of the plaice must be discarded.  
 
The 40 cm Danish minimum mesh size for cod in the North Sea and Skagerrak is dis-
regarded in the CBA. The reason is that the calculations are performed for a base case 
and a case with gear changes. Both cases include all the age-groups listed in Table 
4.1.8 The effect of that is, however, that the positive impact of a gear change will be 
underestimated because the largest fall in landings in the first years after a gear 
change will relate to age-group one.  
 
Cod, plaice and other species are caught by using a variety of gear types, in particular 
gill-nets and trawls. It is assumed the fishing mortality induced by gill-nets is un-
changed, and the impact on fishing mortality caused by changes in the trawl fishery is 
partitioned according to the trawlers’ share of the total landings of these species in the 
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Kattegat and Skagerrak. The trawlers’ share appears in Table 4.1.9, and the figures 
for the Kattegat have been chosen for use in the CBA calculations.  
 
Table 4.1.9 Trawlers’ shares of cod and plaice in the Kattegat and Skagerrak, 2003 
 
 ------------------------- Cod ------------------------- ------------------------ Plaice ---------------------
 
 Total (tonnes) Trawlers as a % of Total Total (tonnes) Trawlers as a % of Total
Skagerrak 3066 43.9% 4846 38.8%
Kattegat 1444 58.9% 2036 34.2%
Total 4510 48.7% 6882 37.4%
 
 
Finally, it is assumed that the gear changes are introduced for all countries at the same 
time. If that were not the case, the fishing mortality rates would have to be adjusted 
according to the Danish share of the total landings. In the Kattegat and Skagerrak, 
Danish landings constitute around two-thirds of the cod and 85% of the plaice. 
 
The selectivity data are taken from the trials executed for Tasks 3.2 and 3.3 (see Table 
4.0). Estimates are obtained for nephrops, cod, plaice, whiting, and witch. The trial 
period was autumn 2005. The estimates are preliminary and are used for cod and 
plaice but disregarded for nephrops, whiting, and witch. For nephrops, no stock esti-
mates based on age-structures are available, and the same is true of whiting and witch, 
though they are of less importance. Therefore, landings of these species are assumed 
unaltered after a gear change. The selectivity parameters for cod and plaice are shown 
in Table 4.1.10. 
 
Table 4.1.10. Input data from the selectivity trials for cod and plaice in the Kat-
 tegat and Skagerrak (Area IIIa) 
 
 
 
----------------- Cod ----------------- ----------------- Plaice -----------------
Range r (cm) 6.97 10.93 2.49 11.34
Selection l50 (cm) 23.02 27.05 21.91 18.5
Mesh size (cm) 9 9(12) 9 9(12)
 
Source: The Danish NECESSITY trial team 
 
 
A LOGIT function has been used to calculate the probability of retention (Equation 
(6)). The following shortcomings of the procedure should be noted. The selectivity 
estimates refer to a short period of time, a specific fishing ground and a certain vessel. 
The estimates form the basis for scaling up to the entirety of the fish stocks and fleet 
operations in the area. Therefore, the results from the CBA are vested with consider-
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able uncertainty. The consequences of this are investigated by applying sensitivity 
analysis.   
 
Selectivity ogives are calculated and presented in Figure 4.1.8. The ogives are shown 
for age-groups 1 and upwards for cod and age 2 and upwards for plaice. This implies 
that the effect of the gear change on the 0-group for cod and 0- and 1-groups for 
plaice is disregarded. As no information is recorded for younger age-groups, their in-
clusion would require the use of estimates, for example, from a von Bertalanffy func-
tion, see Equation (8) in Section 1. 
 
Figure 4.1.8. Selectivity curves for the Kattegat and Skagerrak trials 
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Source: the Danish NECESSITY trial team  
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Applying the change in selectivity to the biological projection model, see Table 
4.1.10, the changes between the baseline and the case with a 120mm square-mesh 
panel are shown in Figure 4.1.9 for cod and plaice in value and in weight. For exam-
ple, after 2011 when landings stabilise, the value of landings of cod is nearly 2% 
higher than the baseline figure. 
 
Figure 4.1.9 Projected changes in landings of cod and plaice with a 120mm square-
mesh panel 
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It is noted that the change in value is stronger than the change in weight for both spe-
cies reflecting that the unit price increases in the long-run owing to a change in the 
composition of landings towards older and larger fish that fetch a higher price. There 
is a small fluctuating decrease in cod landings in the beginning of the period, and a 
large decrease in plaice landings. The calculations are based on ICES stock assess-
ments, which entails the uneven age composition witnessed in 2003. This is reflected 
in the beginning of the projection period. After seven years, the system approaches an 
equilibrium, where there will be little tendency to change. 
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4.1.4. Results for Danish Nephrops trawlers fishing in ICES Sub-Area IIIA 
The comparison of the base case, i.e. without gear change, with the case of a gear 
change has been performed using Equations (1) to (4). A number of simplifying as-
sumptions have been made which are summarized below: 
 
 H:  landings are constant for all species except cod and plaice 
P:  fish prices are constant for all species except cod and plaice, where price is 
 a function of size grade  
C:  variable costs are kept constant  
G:  fixed costs are kept constant  
V:  external effects (net) are disregarded i.e. for example, discards are not con
 sidered ecologically or ethically harmful.  
U:  management costs (information gathering, administration, monitoring, con
 trol and enforcement) are kept constant 
I:  investments costs in gear are assumed to be the same with and without gear 
 change 
D:  the discount rate is fixed at 5% 
T:  the time horizon is fixed at 10, 20, and 30 years 
 
Results from this run are shown in Figure 4.1.10 for the difference in gross revenue 
between the gear change case and the base case. As it is assumed that only one gear 
type is used, the impact of the gear change on the larger trawlers is the strongest. This 
is caused by the relatively higher share of cod and plaice in these trawlers’ landings. 
The projection is shown for 10 years. This period is long enough to enable the stock 
to reach biological equilibrium, as constant recruitment and mortality rates are as-
sumed.  
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Figure 4.1.10. Changes in gross revenue at the vessel level 
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As a consequence of the cost assumptions, the indicator used to calculate net present 
value is the gross margin, defined as gross revenue minus variable costs exclusive of 
crew share. In fact, the decision rule would make the same choice of case even if the 
NPV of gross revenue was used. The results are presented in Table 4.1.11.  
 
Fishermen will emphasise the importance of the short period, 10 years, and probably 
less, while society will place greater stress on the 20- to 30-year periods. The results 
show that not all fishermen might accept society’s view. At the fleet segment level, 
smaller vessels will benefit over 10 years while the larger ones would not. Over a 
long time horizon of 20 to 30 years all segments will benefit.   
 
Table 4.1.11.  Net present value (NPV) over 10, 20 and 30 years 
 
Vessel level Segment level 
Length 10 20 30 Length No. of vessels 10 20 30
 €000   €000 
 
12-15m 0.5 2.5 3.8 12-15m 86 39 217 326
15-18m 0.7 2.4 3.5 15-18m 84 55 203 294
18-24m -0.4 1.8 3.2 18-24m 96 -42 172 304
24-40m -1.7 0.4 1.7 24-40m 61 -106 24 104
 
NPV=gross revenue minus variable costs (before remuneration of labour and capital) 
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The direction in which the NPV would move as a result of changes in the assumptions 
is shown in Table 4.1.12. It is to be expected that the fishermen will minimise their 
costs but a gear change would lead to cost increases. 
 
Table 4.1.12  Impact of assumptions 
 
 NPV increase NPV decrease
 
C: variable costs increase  X
G: fixed costs increase X
V: external effects (net) positive X
U: management costs increase X
I: investments costs in gear increase X
D: the discount rate increase X
Broader design of analysis to include gill-net and seine X
 
 
As all costs are kept constant throughout the period over which the NPV is calculated, 
cost increases will lead to lower net present values and therefore to less incentive to 
accept gear changes. External effects are of little interest to the fishermen, but are of 
concern to society. If a higher value is placed on them, the NPV will increase from 
society’s point of view. 
 
A discount rate of 5% is applied, which is  a level used in many public projects, but it 
is considered high, for example, compared to HM Treasury’s (United Kingdom) rec-
ommendation at 3.5%. On the other hand, surveys indicate that the private discount 
rate could be as high as 20%. 
 
The general conclusion is that, from society’s point of view, the appositive effect of 
introducing a 120mm square-mesh panel in nephrops trawls cannot be rejected. There 
is a positive net present value for periods longer than 10 years, and below ten years 
positive effects arise for small vessels, while negative effects emerge for larger ves-
sels.  It has to be noted, however, that it is assumed that landings of nephrops will re-
main unchanged, while for cod and plaice together, a positive effect will occur. Other 
demersal species are assumed to remain unchanged between the baseline and the case 
with gear changes. 
 
The effects are small and most sensitivity analyses regarding the trawl fishery tend to 
influence the net present value negatively. An instant positive effect for gill-netters 
and seiners, that are very dependent on cod and plaice, will occur. This effect is not 
evaluated in the project. 
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4.2. Aran, Clyde, Farn, and Irish Sea 
The trials concerning nephrops caught in Aran, Clyde, Farn Deeps and Irish Sea 
(Smalls) grounds are shown in Table 4.0.  The location of nephrops grounds in the 
North Sea is illustrated in Map 4.0. 
4.2.1. Landings 
It is suggested that, for the North Sea as a whole, the abundance of nephrops has gen-
erally been increasing in recent years (ICES 2006).  A general overview of the North 
Sea nephrops fisheries has already been provided in Section 4.1.1.2 and covers, in 
particular, the important Fladen Ground (Functional Unit 7) situated in Area IVa.  Be-
low we present an overview focusing primarily on the Farn Deeps, the most signifi-
cant nephrops ground in ICES Area IVb.  
 
4.2.1.1. Farn Deeps  
Nephrops from the Farn deeps appear to be exploited at a sustainable level (ICES 
2006) and in the decade leading up to 2004 landings have tended to fluctuate between 
2,000 and 2,500 tonnes (Figure 4.2.1.).  Analytical stock assessments are not under-
taken, so TV surveys, CPUE and LPUE are used in their place.  All signs currently 
indicate the stocks are healthy (ICES 2006).  Landings from the other significant 
ground in Area IVb, the Firth of Forth (Functional Unit 6), tended to fluctuate be-
tween 1,500 and 2,000 tonnes over the same period and it is believed this ground is 
also currently fished at a sustainable level (ICES 2006). 
 
Landings from the Farn Deeps have historically been dominated by English vessels.  
These have taken an average 92% of the area’s total annual landings over the last 
decade, the remaining 8% being taken almost entirely by Scottish vessels.  Farn 
Deeps nephrops landings accounted for 54% of all such landings by UK vessels from 
the four Functional Units3 in Area IVb in 2004 (ICES 2006).  The Firth of Forth ac-
counted for a further 41% in the same period, almost 100% of which were taken by 
Scottish vessels (Figure 4.2.2). 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
3 The Functional units (FUs) in Area IVb consist of; FU 5, Boney Gut/Silver Pit; FU 6, Farn Deeps; 
FU 8, Firth of Forth; and FU 33, Off Horne Reef.  
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Figure 4.2.1. Nominal landings of Nephrops (tonnes) from the Farn Deeps (Func-
tional Unit 6) by country, 1981 to 2004 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2006, Table 3.4.4.2  
 
 
ICES calculates CPUE and LPUE for the Farn Deeps in terms of catches and landings 
per hour of trawling (kg/hr-1) (UK vessels) using logbook data (Figure 4.2.2.).   Nei-
ther of the measures indicates overexploitation, both tending to show an upward 
trend.  CPUE and LPUE in 2004 were the highest on record at 50.3 and 32.7 kg/hr-1 
of trawling, respectively.  Provisional figures for 2005 were even higher at 56.7 and 
38.7 kg/hr-1. 
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Figure 4.2.2 Nephrops landings and LPUE from the Farn Deeps (UK Nephrops 
trawlers) and the Firth of Forth (Scottish vessels) 1985 to 2004. 
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Source: ICES, WGNSSK Report 2006, Tables 3.4.4.8 and 3.4.4.4 
 
 
4.2.2. Fleets, costs and earnings 
The 2005 economic survey of the UK fishing fleet (Anderson  et al 2007) provides 
average and total figures for nephrops vessels operating in the North Sea, West of 
Scotland and Irish Sea (see Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, respectively).  These indicate that 
UK nephrops vessels operating in the North Sea earned more on average than those 
operating off the West of Scotland, with those in the Irish Sea earning least. The UK 
North Sea nephrops segments have also seen large increases in the level of profit they 
have made since 2001.  The survey reports that in 2005 single- and twin-rig vessels 
made average profits of approximately £43,000 (€63,000) and £87,000 (€128,000) 
(before depreciation and interest), respectively. More-detailed information relating to 
area of capture and composition of landings is unknown for these vessels and as such 
cannot be directly employed in the analysis.  However, assuming these vessels are 
representative of nephrops vessels for the areas to which they pertain they provide 
some insight into the differing cost structures. 
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Table 4.2.1 Average costs, earnings and vessel characteristics, UK vessels in 2005 
Segment 
Fishing in-
comea
Non-fishing 
incomea
Crew sha-
rea
Gross cash 
flowa
Net profit (after depre-
ciation & interest) a
Gross va-
lue-addeda
Days fished 
in 2005
Volume of lan-
dings (tonnes)
Vessel po-
wer (kW)
Average
length (m)
 
Nephrops 
trawl 
234 12 68 59 19 126 165 98 253 16
North Sea Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
385 19 102 114 47 216 176 152 371 20
Nephrops 
trawl 
103 2 33 19 13 52 156 35 166 15
West of 
Scotland Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
196 18 54 61 21 115 186 66 261 17
Nephrops 
trawl 
93 11 27 16 16 44 148 61 187 16
Irish Sea Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
154 16 53 29 6 81 179 97 316 19
a £000 s                                      
 Source: Anderson et al, 2007 
 
Table 4.2.2 Total costs, earnings and segment characteristics, UK vessels in 2005 
Segment 
Total vessel 
population
Active vessel
population
Fishing in-
comea
Crew sha-
rea
Gross cash 
flowa
Net profit (after depre-
ciation & landingsa
Gross va-
lue-addeda
Days at 
seab
Volume of landings 
(000  tonnes)
Power kW 
sb
 
Nephrops 
trawl 
133 130 30.40 8.70 7.60 2.40 16.30 21.4 12.7 32.9
North Sea Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
55 55 21.10 5.60 6.20 2.60 11.30 9.6 8.3 20.4
Nephrops 
trawl 
133 130 13.30 4.20 2.40 1.60 6.70 20.3 4.5 21.6
West of 
Scotland Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
26 26 4.90 1.30 1.50 0.50 2.80 4.6 1.6 6.5
Nephrops 
trawl 
62 61 5.60 1.60 0.90 0.90 2.60 8.9 3.7 11.4
Irish Sea Nephrops 
twin rig trawl 
34 31 4.70 1.60 0.80 0.10 2.50 5.5 3 10.1
a £m, b 000 s                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Source: Anderson et al, 2007 
 
 4.2.3. CBA projections and results 
The purpose of this study has been to undertake a CBA that considered the effects of 
vessels currently targeting nephrops taking up modified fishing gear in an effort to 
reduce the associated whitefish by-catch.  This is considered against a baseline of 
‘business as usual’ where vessels continue to operate employing their current gears 
with catches fixed at the level observed in the base year (i.e. positive or negative in-
crements to revenues and costs as a direct result of the adoption of the novel gear).   
This negates the need for full costs and earnings data relating to the nephrops fleet (as 
all other costs are assumed constant).   
 
Cases 3.5 (large-mesh escape panel) and 3.6 (cutaway trawl) have been considered; 
3.8 was not undertaken.   Sea trials for Case 3.5 were originally conducted west of 
Scotland, as outlined in Table 4.0.  However, more-comprehensive data was later ob-
tained from additional trials in the North Sea.  Case 3.6 was also conducted in the 
North Sea (Farn Deeps).  Each trial applied a different combination of gear modifica-
tions.  Case 3.5, the CEFAS/SFIA trial, compared a ‘standard’ commercial trawl 
(85mm cod-end mesh) and a ‘cutaway trawl’ that used a cod-end mesh of 80mm, a 
90mm square-mesh panel and a section of 200mm diamond mesh fitted to the upper 
panels behind the headline (see Revill et al, (2006) for full gear specification).  Case 
3.6, the FRS/BIM trial, compared; a ‘EU standard’ commercial nephrops trawl 
(80mm cod-end mesh); and trawl with 95mm cod-end with 100 open meshes and a 
5m long 120mm knotless square-mesh panel (SMP) inserted 4m to 9m from the cod-
line (see Kynoch et al (2006) for full gear specification). 
 
Catch-comparison data obtained from the sea trials for Cases 3.5 and 3.6 were applied 
to observed landings by UK nephrops trawl vessels from Area IVb.  Landings figures 
for nephrops, cod, haddock and whiting were obtained from the UK Marine and Fish-
eries Agency (MFA) for the years 2003 and 2005 and are used as base years in the 
analysis.  Nephrops vessels were defined as those vessels using a minimum mesh size 
of 80mm where nephrops constitute over 30% of landings, following Annex I of EC 
Regulation 850/1998.  This UK fleet was subdivided into four segments over 10m 
registered length, and one under 10m.  A 24m to 36m category was initially consid-
ered, however, as the number of vessels exceeding 24m was very low an 18m to 36m 
category was used instead.   
 
The initial cost of uptake relating to the new gears (i.e. the cost of adapting existing 
gears) is considered low and expected to be relatively inconsequential.  The total cost 
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 of labour and materials for the gear tested in Case 3.6 was estimated at around £500 
(€735) per vessel (Pers. comm. Ferro R.S.T, 2007).  The frequency and cost of replac-
ing the gear was also assumed to be in line with existing costs.  Reductions in revenue 
were derived by estimating the value of whitefish ‘by-catch’ expected to be lost as a 
direct result of the trial gears’ altered efficiency. 
 
Landings, share and price of nephrops, cod, haddock and whiting for the base year of 
2003 are shown in Table 4.2.3.  From this, we can see nephrops are most significant 
in terms of both weight and value for all segments, especially the smaller vessels.  It 
is, however, possible that in the case of <10m vessels this is more an artefact of log-
books not being mandatory for vessels of this size.  In all but one case (10m to 12m) 
haddock is the next most valuable species landed, followed by cod and then whiting.  
Information on changes in selectivity relating to ‘other’ species such as sole or angler-
fish was not available and therefore considered to remain constant.  Highest average 
unit prices for nephrops are attained, first, by the largest vessels (18m to 36m) and 
secondly, the smallest (<10m).  The price nephrops attain is strongly influenced by 
their quality at sale.   
 
Table 4.2.3  Landings composition for UK Nephrops trawl vessels operating in 
Area IVb, base year 2003 
 
Weight 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting Total (tonnes)
Length 
<10m 0.50% 4.22% 94.09% 1.20% 569
10-12m 4.71% 6.25% 86.49% 2.56% 722
12-15m 4.25% 9.34% 80.90% 5.51% 884
15-18m 7.13% 16.44% 67.56% 8.87% 1468
18-36m 5.66% 21.68% 61.43% 11.22% 2084
 
Value 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting Total( €000 )
Length 
<10m 0.22% 1.22% 93.39% 0.18% 1907.03
10-12m 2.67% 2.20% 94.75% 0.38% 1853.71
12-15m 2.81% 4.07% 91.89% 1.22% 1994.70
15-18m 4.40% 6.12% 87.52% 1.96% 3497.62
18-36m 3.22% 4.63% 89.65% 2.49% 5511.09
 
Unit price in € 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting
Length 
<10m 1.48 0.97 3.50 0.50
10-12m 1.46 0.91 2.81 0.38
12-15m 1.50 0.98 2.56 0.50
15-18m 1.47 0.89 3.09 0.53
18-36m 1.51 0.56 3.86 0.59
 
Source: UK Marine and Fisheries Agency (MFA) 
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 The effect of uptake was estimated for each trial gear (Cases 3.5 and 3.6) against the 
base case of ‘business as usual’ in 2003 or 2005.  Estimating the net present value 
(NPV) in each case required a number of assumptions to be made.  Case 3.5 under-
took trials on vessels of differing size and determined that the trawls’ selectivity pa-
rameters were not significantly altered by vessel size (Revill et al 2006).  It was there-
fore assumed the gear effects would be uniformly felt by all sizes of vessel within the 
fleet.   
 
No significant difference in the landings of nephrops was observed in either set of tri-
als. It is therefore assumed the trial gears are neutral with respect to the selectivity of 
this species (Revill et al 2006, Kynoch et al 2006).  Furthermore, catch comparison 
data pertaining to each case resulted in the assumption that landings of all species ex-
cept cod, haddock and whiting in Case 3.5 and whiting in Case 3.6 remain constant.  
Additionally we assume; the gear is adopted at the same point in time by all vessels; 
fixed costs are constant; unit prices remain constant; management costs are constant; 
the net external effects are constant; and a discount rate of 5% over a time horizon of 
10, 20 and 30 years, with all benefits and costs assumed constant after the first 10 
years.  We also assume that all social benefits and costs are fully reflected in the pri-
vate (i.e. economic) benefits and costs to the nephrops trawlers.  Other social uses of 
the resource are angling or other non-use values associated with healthier whitefish 
stocks.  This extends to not accounting for any subsequent changes in consumer sur-
plus that may occur from increased whitefish landings. 
 
Under the above assumptions, Scenario 1 considers the effects of expected reductions 
in whitefish by-catch on UK vessel revenue from nephrops in Area IVb, as indicated 
by the two sets of sea trials.  A 5% discount rate is applied and no subsequent increase 
in whitefish landings, as a result of stock levels recovering, is allowed for (Table 
4.2.4.).  Sensitivity analysis is then performed by considering Scenario 1 under dis-
count rates of 3.5, 7.5 and 10% (Table 4.2.6). 
 
Scenario 2 develops 1 by allowing for a 0.5% year-on-year increase in the landings of 
whitefish to nephrops vessels for the first 10 years and no further change (above the 
5% increase) thereafter (Table 4.2.5).  Applying a uniform percentage value to ex-
pected landings after accounting for the new gear is somewhat simplistic but allows 
us to postulate on the potential compensatory effect to nephrops vessels from any 
whitefish stock recovery.  The 0.5% increase is hypothetical but loosely based around 
estimates from studies relating to the cases.  A range of year-on-year increases was 
then applied (1%, 2% and 5%) (Table 4.2.7).  
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The analysis was then repeated using a base year of 2005 and the same scenarios con-
sidered (see appendix for tables).  Additionally, the trial gear NPV as a proportion of 
the business as usual NPV (assuming catch quantities, values and composition of the 
base year) was calculated and is reported in the results tables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.2.4. Results for UK vessels fishing in Area IVb 
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Table 4.2.4.  Scenario 1: Net Present Value (NPV) over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2003 
 
 --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV
Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
 --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
 
<10m -1.71 -2.64 -3.20 88 -150.41 -231.89 -281.91 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
10-12m -7.62 -11.75 -14.29 40 -304.66 -469.98 -571.48 -1.88% -1.88% -1.88%
12-15m -21.88 -33.77 -41.06 29 -634.58 -979.21 -1,190.79 -3.65% -3.65% -3.65%
15-18m -46.04 -71.05 -86.41 37 -1,703.40 -2,628.97 -3,197.19 -5.58% -5.58%
3.5 – large 
mesh escape 
panel 
18-36m -32.84 -50.68 -61.64 72 -2,364.29 -3,649.07 -4,437.82 -4.92% -4.92%
-5.58%
-4.92%
 
<10m -0.17 -0.26 -0.32 88 -15.02 -23.19 -28.20 -0.09% -0.09% -0.09%
10-12m -0.78 -1.20 -1.46 40 -31.11 -48.01 -58.39 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19%
12-15m -3.70 -5.70 -6.94 29 -107.18 -165.44 -201.20 -0.62% -0.62% -0.62%
15-18m -8.18 -12.63 -15.36 37 -302.69 -467.20 -568.20 -0.99% -0.99%
3.6 – cutaway 
trawl 
18-36m -8.40 -12.97 -15.78 72 -605.05 -933.91 -1,135.80 -1.26% -1.26%
-0.99%
-1.26%
 
5% Discount rate 
 
Table 4.2.5.  Scenario 2: Net Present Value (NPV) over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2003, allowing for a 0.5% year on year increase 
in whitefish landings over the first 10 years (constant thereafter) 
 
 --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV
Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
 --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
 
<10m -1.68 -2.57 -3.11 88 -147.73 -225.99 -274.03 -0.89% -0.88% -0.88%
10-12m -7.31 -11.07 -13.38 40 -292.36 -442.87 -535.26 -1.81% -1.77% -1.76%
12-15m -21.28 -32.43 -39.28 29 -617.05 -940.58 -1,139.20 -3.55% -3.50% -3.49%
15-18m -44.20 -67.00 -81.00 37 -1,635.34 -2,478.96 -2,996.87 -5.36% -5.26%
3.5 – large 
mesh escape 
panel 
18-36m -32.02 -48.88 -59.23 72 -2,305.39 -3,519.25 -4,264.46 -4.80% -4.74%
-5.23%
-4.73%
 
<10m -0.17 -0.26 -0.31 88 -14.69 -22.45 -27.22 -0.09% -0.09% -0.09%
10-12m -0.76 -1.16 -1.41 40 -30.42 -46.50 -56.37 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19%
12-15m -3.61 -5.52 -6.70 29 -104.82 -160.22 -194.24 -0.60% -0.60% -0.59%
15-18m -8.00 -12.23 -14.83 37 -296.00 -452.47 -548.53 -0.97% -0.96%
3.6 – cutaway 
trawl 
18-36m -8.22 -12.56 -15.23 72 -591.69 -904.46 -1,096.47 -1.23% -1.22%
-0.96%
-1.22%
 
5% Discount rate 
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Table 4.2.6.  Scenario 1: NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2003, allowing for discount rates of 3.5, 7.5 and 10% 
   
Dis-   --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV a
count- Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
rate   --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
   
<10m -1.83 -2.98 -3.79 88 -160.64 -261.97 -333.82 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
10-12m -8.14 -13.28 -16.92 40 -325.41 -531.02 -676.78 -1.88% -1.88% -1.88%
12-15m -23.37 -38.15 -48.63 29 -677.82 -1,106.45 -1,410.31 -3.65% -3.65% -3.65%
15-18m -49.18 -80.29 -102.34 37 -1,819.55 -2,970.69 -3,786.76 -5.58% -5.58%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 
-5.58%
18-36m -35.08 -57.27 -73.00 72 -2,525.52 -4,123.42 -5,256.20 -4.92% -4.92% -4.92%
  
<10m -0.18 -0.30 -0.38 88 -16.05 -26.20 -33.40 -0.09% -0.09% -0.09%
10-12m -0.83 -1.36 -1.73 40 -33.23 -54.25 -69.16 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19%
12-15m -3.95 -6.45 -8.22 29 -114.49 -186.95 -238.31 -0.62% -0.62% -0.62%
15-18m -8.74 -14.27 -18.19 37 -323.33 -527.94 -673.00 -0.99% -0.99% -0.99%
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -8.98 -14.66 -18.68 72 -646.32 -1,055.33 -1,345.28 -1.26% -1.26% -1.26%
   
<10m -1.54 -2.19 -2.51 88 -135.67 -192.91 -220.69 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
10-12m -6.87 -9.77 -11.18 40 -274.75 -390.90 -447.25 -1.88% -1.88% -1.88%
12-15m -19.73 -28.08 -32.13 29 -572.22 -814.35 -931.82 -3.65% -3.65% -3.65%
15-18m -41.51 -59.09 -67.61 37 -1,535.95 -2,186.20 -2,501.70 -5.58% -5.58% -5.58%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -29.61 -42.15 -48.23 72 -2,131.85 -3,034.47 -3,472.41 -4.92% -4.92% -4.92%
  
<10m -0.15 -0.22 -0.25 88 -13.54 -19.28 -22.06 -0.09% -0.09% -0.09%
10-12m -0.70 -1.00 -1.14 40 -28.05 -39.92 -45.69 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19%
12-15m -3.33 -4.74 -5.43 29 -96.64 -137.57 -157.43 -0.62% -0.62% -0.62%
15-18m -7.38 -10.50 -12.02 37 -272.92 -388.50 -444.58 -0.99% -0.99% -0.99%
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -7.58 -10.79 -12.34 72 -545.55 -776.59 -888.69 -1.26% -1.26% -1.26%
   
<10m -1.40 -1.86 -2.04 88 -123.30 -164.02 -179.72 -0.90% 
 
 
 
-0.90% -0.90%
10-12m -6.24 -8.31 -9.10 40 -249.66 -332.28 -364.13 -1.88% -1.88% -1.88%
12-15m -17.93 -23.87 -26.16 29 -519.91 -692.14 -758.54 -3.65% -3.65% -3.65%
15-18m -37.72 -50.22 -55.04 37 -1,395.46 -1,858.00 -2,036.33 -5.58% -5.58%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 
-5.58%
 18-36m -26.90 -35.82 -39.26 72 -1,936.84 -2,578.90 -2,826.44 -4.92% -4.92% -4.92%
  
<10m -0.14 -0.19 -0.20 88 -0.14 -0.19 -0.20 -0.09% -0.09%10 -0.09%
10-12m -0.64 -0.85 -0.93 40 -0.64 -0.85 -0.93 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19%
12-15m -3.03 -4.03 -4.42 29 -3.03 -4.03 -4.42 -0.62% -0.62% -0.62%
15-18m -6.70 -8.92 -9.78 37 -6.70 -8.92 -9.78 -0.99% -0.99%
3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -6.88 -9.17 -10.05 72 -6.88 -9.17 -10.05 -1.26% -1.26%
 
 
-0.99%
-1.26%
 
a These values are the same for every rate of discount as both the ‘trial’ gear NPV and ‘business as usual’ NPV have the same discount rate applied 
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Table 4.2.7.  NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2003, allowing for a 1, 2 and 5% year on year increase in whitefish landings over 
the first 10 years (constant at 10, 20 and 50, respectively, thereafter) 
   
  --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV a
Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
% increase 
in whitefish 
landings   --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
   
<10m -1.65 -2.50 -3.02 88 -150.41 -231.89 -281.91 -0.87% -0.86% -0.85%
10-12m -7.00 -10.39 -12.48 40 -304.66 -469.98 -571.48 -1.73% -1.67% -1.64%
12-15m -20.67 -31.10 -37.50 29 -634.58 -979.21 -1190.79 -3.45% -3.36% -3.33%
15-18m -42.36 -62.94 -75.58 37 -1703.40 -2628.97 -3197.19 -5.14% -4.95% -4.88%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -31.20 -47.08 -56.82 72 -2364.29 -3649.07 -4437.82 -4.67% -4.57% -4.53%
  
<10m -0.16 -0.25 -0.30 88 -14.36 -21.72 -26.24 -0.09% -0.08% -0.08%
10-12m -0.74 -1.12 -1.36 40 -29.73 -44.98 -54.35 -0.18% -0.18% -0.18%
12-15m -3.53 -5.34 -6.46 29 -102.45 -155.00 -187.27 -0.59% -0.58% -0.57%
15-18m -7.82 -11.83 -14.29 37 -289.32 -437.74 -528.85 -0.95% -0.93% -0.92%
 
 
 
 
 
1 3.6 – 
cuta-
way 
trawl 
18-36m -8.03 -12.15 -14.68 72 -578.32 -875.01 -1,057.14 -1.20% -1.18% -1.17%
   
<10m -1.59 -2.37 -2.85 88 -139.70 -208.29 -250.40 -0.84% -0.81% -0.80%
10-12m -6.39 -9.04 -10.67 40 -255.45 -361.52 -426.63 -1.58% -1.45% -1.41%
12-15m -19.46 -28.44 -33.95 29 -564.47 -824.70 -984.45 -3.24% -3.07% -3.01%
15-18m -38.68 -54.84 -64.75 37 -1,431.14 -2,028.92 -2,395.91 -4.69% -4.31% -4.18%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -29.56 -43.47 -52.01 72 -2,128.68 -3,129.78 -3,744.37 -4.43% -4.22% -4.15%
  
<10m -0.16 -0.23 -0.28 88 -13.69 -20.26 -24.29 -0.08% -0.08% -0.08%
10-12m -0.71 -1.05 -1.26 40 -28.36 -41.96 -50.30 -0.18% -0.17% -0.17%
12-15m -3.37 -4.99 -5.98 29 -97.71 -144.57 -173.33 -0.56% -0.54% -0.53%
15-18m -7.46 -11.03 -13.23 37 -275.94 -408.27 -489.50 -0.90% -0.87% -0.85%
 
 
 
 
 
2 3.6 – 
cuta-
way 
trawl 
18-36m -7.66 -11.33 -13.59 72 -551.60 -816.10 -978.48 -1.15% -1.10% -1.08%
   
<10m -1.41 -1.96 -2.31 88 -123.64 -172.89 -203.13 -0.74% -0.67% -0.65%
10-12m -4.54 -4.97 -5.23 40 -181.63 -198.82 -209.37 -1.12% -0.80% -0.69%
12-15m -15.84 -20.45 -23.27 29 -459.31 -592.92 -674.95 -2.64% -2.21% -2.07%
15-18m -27.64 -30.51 -32.27 37 -1,022.76 -1,128.86 -1,193.99 -3.35% -2.40% -2.09%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
pane 18-36m -24.66 -32.65 -37.56 72 -1,775.25 -2,350.84 -2,704.21 -3.69% -3.17% -3.00%
  
<10m -0.13 -0.18 -0.21 88 -11.70 -15.87 -18.43 -0.07% -0.06% -0.06%
10-12m -0.61 -0.82 -0.95 40 -24.24 -32.87 -38.17 -0.15% -0.13% -0.13%
12-15m -2.88 -3.91 -4.54 29 -83.51 -113.26 -131.53 -0.48% -0.42% -0.40%
15-18m -6.37 -8.64 -10.04 37 -235.83 -319.86 -371.44 -0.77% -0.68% -0.65%
 
 
 
 
 
5 3.6 – 
cuta-
way 
trawl 
18-36m -6.55 -8.88 -10.31 72 -471.41 -639.38 -742.49 -0.98% -0.86% -0.82%
5% Discount rate
 The NPV, for UK nephrops vessels, of undertaking any of the cases, under all the 
scenarios considered, is consistently negative.  However, even in the worst-case sce-
nario (Scenario 1), in which the nephrops vessels fail to feel any compensatory effect 
from whitefish stocks recovering, the projected reductions in revenue are marginal.  
The greatest impact will be felt by the 15m to 18m sector under Case 3.5 (an ap-
proximately 5.6% loss) and the 18m to 36m sector under Case 3.6 (an approximately 
1.3% loss) (Table 4.2.4.).  In both cases, the smaller vessels feel less of an impact as 
whitefish had a less significant effect on revenue in the first instance. Again, however, 
the effect on the <10m fleet may not be fully accounted for.  A very similar pattern 
was also observed when using a base year of 2005 but in this instance, the greatest 
impact was felt by the 15m to 18m fleet in both cases (see; Table 4.2.9).  In addition, 
the relative magnitude of all vessel losses would further diminish if the landings of 
‘other’ species were included in the analysis.   Lastly, it is thought unlikely that the 
potential losses nephrops vessels are expected to incur in adopting either of the gears 
will be significantly offset by whitefish stocks increasing (and therefore increasing 
their contribution to landings). 
  
From the policy perspective, any perceived reduction in revenue (that is often ob-
served to result in larger than proportional reductions in profits) is likely to make 
nephrops vessels unwilling voluntarily to adopt the gears, however marginal the 
losses may be.  As such, mandatory uptake with some form of compensatory (perhaps 
transfer) payment may be required.    
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Appendix to Section 4.2.3 
Table 4.2.8.  Landings composition for UK Nephrops trawl vessels operating in 
Area IVb, base year 2005 
 
Weight 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting Total (tonnes)
Length 
<10m 0.65% 0.72% 94.10% 4.53% 1,132
10-12m 1.31% 0.98% 92.53% 5.17% 909
12-15m 2.04% 2.56% 82.00% 13.40% 1,298
15-18m 3.65% 6.95% 64.72% 24.69% 1,598
18-36m 4.60% 12.59% 65.74% 17.06% 2,022
 
Value 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting Total ( €000 )
Length 
<10m 0.22% 0.19% 99.05% 0.54% 4,670,003
10-12m 0.69% 0.38% 98.08% 0.85% 2,820,398
12-15m 1.27% 1.16% 94.84% 2.73% 3,332,121
15-18m 2.58% 3.23% 88.32% 5.86% 3,633,965
18-36m 2.94% 4.66% 88.03% 4.38% 5,158,643
 
Unit price in € 
Vessel Cod Haddock Nephrops Whiting
Length 
<10m 1.39 1.06 4.34 0.49
10-12m 1.62 1.21 3.29 0.51
12-15m 1.60 1.16 2.97 0.52
15-18m 1.61 1.06 3.10 0.54
18-36m 1.63 0.94 3.42 0.65
 
Source: UK Marine and Fisheries Agency (MFA) 
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Table 4.2.9.  Scenario 1: NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2005 
 
 --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV
Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
 --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
 
<10m -2.45 -3.77 -4.59 88 -210.36 -324.43 -394.45 -0.52% -0.52% -0.52%
10-12m -6.69 -10.32 -12.54 40 -220.76 -340.48 -413.98 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
12-15m -22.80 -35.18 -42.78 29 -797.88 -1,231.27 -1,497.33 -2.75% -2.74% -2.74%
15-18m -69.38 -107.07 -130.22 37 -2,011.88 -3,105.11 -3,776.26 -6.35%
3.5 – large 
mesh escape 
panel 
18-36m -49.18 -75.90 -92.31 72 -2,803.16 -4,326.47 -5,261.65 -6.23%
-6.35% -6.35%
-6.23% -6.23%
 
<10m -1.30 -2.01 -2.44 88 -111.88 -172.69 -210.02 -0.27% -0.27% -0.27%
10-12m -3.20 -4.94 -6.01 40 -105.59 -162.98 -198.21 -0.43% -0.43% -0.43%
12-15m -11.45 -17.67 -21.49 29 -400.70 -618.49 -752.20 -1.38% -1.38% -1.38%
15-18m -32.39 -49.99 -60.80 37 -939.20 -1,449.67 -1,763.06 -2.96%
3.6 – cutaway 
trawl 
18-36m -17.46 -26.96 -32.78 72 -995.43 -1,536.47 -1,868.63 -2.21%
-2.96% -2.96%
-2.21% -2.21%
 
5% Discount rate 
 
 
Table 4.2.10.  Scenario 2: NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2005, allowing for a 0.5% year on year increase in whitefish land-
ings over the first 10 years (constant thereafter) 
 
 --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV
Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
 --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
 
<10m -2.40 -3.67 -4.45 88 -206.38 -315.65 -382.73 -0.51% -0.50% -0.50%
10-12m -6.52 -9.94 -12.04 40 -215.08 -327.95 -397.24 -0.87% -0.86% -0.86%
12-15m -22.34 -34.18 -41.45 29 -782.04 -1,196.37 -1,450.73 -2.69% -2.67% -2.66%
15-18m -67.42 -102.76 -124.45 37 -1,955.09 -2,979.96 -3,609.14 -6.17%
3.5 – large 
mesh escape 
panel 
18-36m -48.15 -73.65 -89.30 72 -2,744.80 -4,197.86 -5,089.91 -6.10%
-6.09% -6.07%
-6.04% -6.03%
 
<10m -1.27 -1.94 -2.36 88 -109.41 -167.25 -202.75 -0.27% -0.27% -0.27%
10-12m -3.13 -4.78 -5.80 40 -103.26 -157.84 -191.35 -0.42% -0.42% -0.41%
12-15m -11.20 -17.11 -20.75 29 -391.85 -598.99 -726.15 -1.35% -1.34% -1.33%
15-18m -31.67 -48.41 -58.69 37 -918.45 -1,403.95 -1,702.01 -2.90%
3.6 – cutaway 
trawl 
18-36m -17.08 -26.11 -31.65 72 -973.45 -1,488.02 -1,803.92 -2.16%
-2.87% -2.86%
-2.14% -2.14%
 
5% Discount rate 
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Table 4.2.11.  Scenario 1: NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2005, allowing for discount rates of 3.5, 7.5 and 10% 
   
Dis-   --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV a
count  Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
rate   --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
   
<10m -2.61 -4.26 -5.43 86 -224.68 -366.54 -467.11 -0.52% -0.52% -0.52%
10-12m -7.15 -11.66 -14.86 33 -235.79 -384.68 -490.24 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
12-15m -24.35 -39.75 -50.67 35 -852.26 -1,391.28 -1,773.40 -2.75% -2.74% -2.74%
15-18m -74.11 -120.99 -154.23 29 -2,149.06 -3,508.73 -4,472.63 -6.35%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -52.53 -85.77 -109.33 57 -2,994.31 -4,888.88 -6,231.97 -6.23%
-6.35% -6.35%
-6.23% -6.23%
  
<10m -1.39 -2.27 -2.89 86 -119.51 -195.14 -248.76 -0.27% -0.27% -0.27%
10-12m -3.42 -5.58 -7.11 33 -112.79 -184.17 -234.77 -0.43% -0.43% -0.43%
12-15m -12.23 -19.97 -25.46 35 -428.03 -698.90 -890.93 -1.38% -1.38% -1.38%
15-18m -34.60 -56.49 -72.01 29 -1,003.26 -1,638.14 -2,088.23 -2.96%
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -18.65 -30.46 -38.83 57 -1,063.33 -1,736.23 -2,213.26 -2.21%
-2.96% -2.96%
-2.21% -2.21%
   
<10m -2.21 -3.14 -3.59 86 -189.72 -269.86 -308.74 -0.52% -0.52% -0.52%
10-12m -6.03 -8.58 -9.82 33 -199.10 -283.21 -324.02 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
12-15m -20.56 -29.26 -33.48 35 -719.47 -1,023.94 -1,171.68 -2.75% -2.74% -2.74%
15-18m -62.55 -89.04 -101.89 29 -1,814.09 -2,582.13 -2,954.79 -6.35%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -44.34 -63.12 -72.23 57 -2,527.56 -3,597.75 -4,117.01 -6.23%
-6.35% -6.35%
-6.23% -6.23%
  
<10m -1.17 -1.67 -1.91 86 -100.88 -143.60 -164.33 -0.27% -0.27% -0.27%
10-12m -2.89 -4.11 -4.70 33 -95.21 -135.53 -155.09 -0.43% -0.43% -0.43%
12-15m -10.32 -14.69 -16.82 35 -361.30 -514.31 -588.55 -1.38% -1.38% -1.38%
15-18m -29.20 -41.57 -47.57 29 -846.84 -1,205.47 -1,379.48 -2.96%
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -15.75 -22.41 -25.65 57 -897.55 -1,277.65 -1,462.08 -2.21%
-2.96% -2.96%
-2.21% -2.21%
   
<10m -2.00 -2.67 -2.92 86 -172.41 -229.41 -251.39 -0.52% -0.52% -0.52%
10-12m -5.48 -7.30 -7.99 33 -180.93 -240.76 -263.83 -0.90% -0.90% -0.90%
12-15m -18.68 -24.86 -27.25 35 -653.68 -870.27 -953.77 -2.75% -2.74% -2.74%
15-18m -56.83 -75.67 -82.94 29 -1,648.16 -2,194.48 -2,405.12 -6.35%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -40.29 -53.64 -58.79 57 -2,296.35 -3,057.60 -3,351.10 -6.23%
-6.35% -6.35%
-6.23% -6.23%
  
<10m -1.07 -1.42 -1.56 86 -1.07 -1.42 -1.56 -0.27% -0.27% -0.27%
10-12m -2.62 -3.49 -3.83 33 -2.62 -3.49 -3.83 -0.43% -0.43% -0.43%
12-15m -9.38 -12.49 -13.69 35 -9.38 -12.49 -13.69 -1.38% -1.38% -1.38%
15-18m -26.53 -35.33 -38.72 29 -26.53 -35.33 -38.72 -2.96%
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -14.31 -19.05 -20.88 57 -14.31 -19.05 -20.88 -2.21%
-2.96% -2.96%
-2.21% -2.21%
 
a These values are the same for every rate of discount as both the ‘trial’ gear NPV and ‘business as usual’ NPV have the same discount rate applied 
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Table 4.2.12.  Scenario 2: NPV over 10, 20 and 30 years, base year 2005, allowing for a 1, 2 and 5% year on year increase in whitefish 
 landings over the first 10 years (constant at 10, 20 and 50, respectively, thereafter) 
   
Dis-   --------------- Vessel level ---------------- No. ----------- Segment level ------------ Trial NPV as proportion of business as usual NPV a
count  Case Length 10 20 30 vessels 10 20 30 10 20 30
rate   --------------------- €000 -------------------- ------------------ €000 -----------------
   
<10m -2.35 -3.57 -4.31 86 -202.40 -306.88 -371.02 -0.50% -0.49% -0.49%
10-12m -6.35 -9.56 -11.53 33 -209.39 -315.41 -380.50 -0.85% -0.83% -0.82%
12-15m -21.89 -33.18 -40.12 35 -766.21 -1,161.47 -1,404.13 -2.64% -2.59% -2.57%
15-18m -65.46 -98.44 -118.69 29 -1,898.31 -2,854.81 -3,442.02 -5.99% -5.84% -5.79%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -47.13 -71.39 -86.28 57 -2,686.45 -4,069.26 -4,918.18 -5.97% -5.86% -5.82%  
<10m -1.24 -1.88 -2.27 86 -106.94 -161.80 -195.48 -0.26% -0.26% -0.26%
10-12m -3.06 -4.63 -5.59 33 -100.93 -152.70 -184.49 -0.41% -0.40% -0.40%
12-15m -10.94 -16.56 -20.00 35 -383.00 -579.48 -700.10 -1.32% -1.29% -1.28%
15-18m -30.96 -46.84 -56.58 29 -897.71 -1,358.23 -1,640.96 -2.83% -2.78% -2.76%
 
 
 
 
 
1 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -16.69 -25.26 -30.51 57 -951.46 -1,439.56 -1,739.21 -2.11% -2.07% -2.06%
   
<10m -2.26 -3.36 -4.04 86 -194.44 -289.33 -347.58 -0.48% -0.46% -0.45%
10-12m -6.00 -8.80 -10.52 33 -198.01 -290.34 -347.02 -0.80% -0.76% -0.75%
12-15m -20.99 -31.19 -37.45 35 -734.54 -1,091.67 -1,310.92 -2.53% -2.43% -2.40%
15-18m -61.54 -89.81 -107.16 29 -1,784.74 -2,604.51 -3,107.78 -5.63% -5.32% -5.22%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -45.08 -66.88 -80.26 57 -2,569.75 -3,812.04 -4,574.71 -5.71% -5.49% -5.42%  
<10m -1.19 -1.75 -2.10 86 -102.00 -150.91 -180.93 -0.25% -0.24% -0.24%
10-12m -2.92 -4.32 -5.17 33 -96.26 -142.42 -170.76 -0.39% -0.38% -0.37%
12-15m -10.44 -15.44 -18.51 35 -365.30 -540.47 -648.01 -1.26% -1.20% -1.19%
15-18m -29.52 -43.68 -52.37 29 -856.22 -1,266.80 -1,518.85 -2.70% -2.59% -2.55%
 
 
 
 
 
2 3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -15.92 -23.56 -28.24 57 -907.49 -1,342.65 -1,609.80 -2.02% -1.93% -1.91%
   
<10m -1.98 -2.75 -3.22 86 -170.55 -236.68 -277.28 -0.42% -0.38% -0.36%
10-12m -4.97 -6.52 -7.47 33 -163.88 -215.12 -246.58 -0.67% -0.57% -0.53%
12-15m -18.27 -25.21 -29.47 35 -639.53 -882.27 -1,031.30 -2.20% -1.97% -1.89%
15-18m -49.79 -63.92 -72.59 29 -1,444.04 -1,853.62 -2,105.07 -4.56% -3.79% -3.54%
3.5 – 
large 
mesh 
escape 
panel 18-36m -38.94 -53.34 -62.18 57 -2,219.64 -3,040.41 -3,544.30 -4.93% -4.38% -4.20%  
<10m -1.01 -1.37 -1.60 86 -87.17 -118.23 -137.30 -0.21% -0.19% -0.18%
10-12m -2.49 -3.38 -3.93 33 -82.27 -111.58 -129.57 -0.33% -0.29% -0.28%
12-15m -8.92 -12.10 -14.05 35 -312.20 -423.44 -491.72 -1.07% -0.94% -0.90%
15-18m -25.23 -34.22 -39.74 29 -731.76 -992.48 -1,152.54 -2.31% -2.03% -1.94%
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
3.6 – cu-
taway 
trawl 
18-36m -13.61 -18.45 -21.43 57 -775.57 -1,051.91 -1,221.55 -1.72% -1.51% -1.45%
 
5% Discount ra
 4.3.  The Bay of Biscay 
Among the fourteen different nephrops case studies defined in the project, see Table 
4.0, two concern experiments based in the Bay of Biscay. They are described in the 
project proposal: 
 
“The French fleets operate in the Celtic Sea and the Bay of Biscay in ICES 
Area VIII. […] The Bay of Biscay fishery is much larger with approximately 
230 trawlers (12 to 16 m) fishing nephrops and species such as monkfish, me-
grim, sole and hake. Annual French landings of nephrops are generally around 
6,000 tonnes. The incidental capture and discard of small hake is prevalent in 
the French nephrops fisheries.” 
 
The two experiments are targeting the same fleets. We can therefore use the same 
data and apply the same methodology in order to complete the cost-benefit analysis. 
4.3.3. General presentation of the fishery 
The fishery located in the Bay of Biscay has the unusual characteristic that nephrops 
are caught by French bottom trawlers and landed, for the most part, alive. Spanish 
vessels capture nephrops only as a by-catch. 
 
The nephrops trawlers operating in the Bay of Biscay are dispersed over the Atlantic 
coast, from La Cotinière in the southern part of the Bay, to Penmarch, at the south-
west foreland of Brittany, in the northern part of the Bay (Figure 4.3.1).  
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Figure 4.3.1 The fishing areas for Nephrops along the French coast 
 
 
 
The fleet is not homogeneous throughout the length of the coast. In fact, boats’ char-
acteristics (mostly the length) are strongly correlated to the mean distance from their 
harbour to their fishing grounds. Roughly, the smaller boats (with a length up to 15m) 
operate mostly in the northern part of the Bay within a 3 to 20 mile zone4. Their typi-
cal fishing trip is 12 to 16 hours long. Nephrops represent half their total gross prod-
uct (Table 4.3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
4 This is a consequence of the French navigation rules which allow these boats to navigate only at a 
maximum of 20 miles from the coast, taking into account the fact that such boats are not sufficiently 
stable to navigate further. 
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Table 4.3.1 The main boat characteristics in the Bay of Biscay (personal elabora-
tion, landings: IFREMER ) 
 
 
* 4 harbours represented : Saint-Guénolé, Le Guilvinec, Lesconil, Loctudy
7%
4%
7%
Landings
42%
10%
30%
South
Les Sables d'Olonne
Le Croisic
Lorient
Pays de Loire
Poitou - Charentes Marennes-Oléron
Boat lengthLocal committees Days at sea
North
Regional committees
Bretagne Concarneau
Guilvinec * 1-2
3
2-3
10-14m
12-18m
16-22m
 
 
 
The larger boats mainly operate in the southern part of the Bay (from Lorient to La 
Cotinière). These boats are more polyvalent and less dependent on nephrops (which 
represent only 25% of their gross product, cf. Table 4.3.3). As their fishing journey is 
longer (between 2 and 3 days), they need to use some specific onboard conservation 
systems to keep the nephrops alive, such as chilled fish-preserves or cold rooms. 
 
Data on nephrops landings have been collected since the beginning of the 1960s. Ac-
cording to fishermen, the catches are highly variable, depending on meteorological 
and environmental variations. Nephrops production has been decreasing since 1992 
and the trend appears to be continuing (Figure 4.3.2). The fall in nominal fishing ef-
fort which occurred over the same period is not the only explanation for this decline 
and may have been partly or wholly compensated for by technical progress5; the fleet 
is extensively equipped with GPS, twin-trawls and sometimes rockhoppers. The boats 
have therefore been able to fish in zones where they had never worked before, near 
rocks or wrecks, especially when they use rockhoppers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
5 The measure of technical progress is crucial to appreciate the real impact of fishing effort on 
commercial stocks. An attempt has been made in the case of the French Mediterranean trawler fleet 
(Kirkley & al.). 
 Figure 4.3.2 Nephrops production in the Bay of Biscay and fishing effort 
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(Source: Ifremer) 
 
 
The spawning stock biomass has recovered from a historical minimum in 1999 and 
2000 and fishing mortality has been decreasing in recent years. Nevertheless, the bi-
ologists responsible for the annual stock evaluation consider that the stock is still in 
danger, especially due to high levels of discards. The current advice is to stabilize 
production and reduce discarding. 
 
Figure 4.3.3 Spawn stock biomass and recruitment evaluations in the Bay of Bis-
cay  
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 4.3.2 Management of the fishery 
The nephrops fishery has two levels of management:  
• several species caught are managed under the EU regulations: the boats apply 
the TAC/quota system for nephrops, hake, and monkfish 
• since 2004, a licence system has been implemented (with the agreement of 
the European Commission). 
 
 
4.3.2.1 The TAC and quota system 
According to the report of the working group on nephrops stocks, “there are no man-
agement objectives set for this fishery” (ICES 2003), which is due to the fact that the 
classical biological reference points (such as F0.1) cannot be calculated. ICES thus 
proposed a precautionary approach be followed to rebuild the spawning stock bio-
mass (SSB) to 18,000 tonnes, its level at the beginning of the 1990s. A large reduc-
tion in fishing effort was therefore required and has been proposed for several years.  
 
The TAC was drastically reduced over a five-year period (by 45%, from 1999 to 
2003, see Table 4.3.2). Paradoxically, the overexploitation has been exacerbated by 
market gluts in spring. 
 
Table 4.3.2 TAC for Nephrops harvested in the Bay of Biscay 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Tonnage 5500 5500 4400 4000 3200 3000 3150 3100
 
Source: ICES 
 
 
Currently, this measure is ineffective; actual landings are not constrained by the TAC 
and before 1999, the TAC was not set at levels intended to constrain fishing activity. 
Since 2000, the ICES advisory group has suggested lower TACs in order to reverse 
the negative trend on the spawning stock biomass (ICES 2003).  
 
Nephrops trawlers also land species which are regulated by the EU TAC/quota sys-
tem; mainly monkfish, hake, megrim and sole. The only species under specific man-
agement is hake. The Hake Recovery Plan imposes several restrictions for boats fish-
ing in a specific “Hake Box”, see figure 4.3.4. In this Box, the minimum trawl mesh 
size was increased from 70mm to 100mm. Between the Box and the coast, boats can 
use 70mm mesh-size trawls only if hake constitutes less than 20% of their catch. 
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Figure 4.3.4 The Hake Box in the Bay of Biscay  
 
 
Source: IFREMER 
 
 
4.3.2.2   The nephrops licence system 
Recently, fishermen’s representatives pointed out that there could be other ways to 
manage the nephrops fishery and proposed alternatives to the TAC reductions. Thus, 
in 2004 a licence system was introduced. The first objective of this measure was to 
evaluate the size of the fleet involved in the fishery, and to identify the different boats 
catching nephrops. This licence system will allow to apply further restrictions such as 
technical measures (gear modifications), temporary closures or individual quotas6. 
The first measure taken within this framework, in 2005, was the implementation of 
sorting grids, in accordance with ACFM recommendations. 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
6 French fishermen’s organisations strongly reject the implementation of Individual Quotas (IQs) or 
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). Moreover, since 1997 French law has forbidden the trans-
ferability of fishing rights.  
 4.3.2.3  Market regulation  
The minimum landings size of nephrops is 7.5cm under EU regulations. French Pro-
fessional Organisations set for some years a market minimum size at 8.5cm. During 
the 2005 winter, they increased this to 9cm, in order to avoid market gluts during 
spring. 
4.3.3 Fleet costs and earnings 
The economic data are provided by the Observatoire Économique Régional des 
Pêches which has a partnership with the CEDEM. The database covers annual eco-
nomic data on; landings (quantities and values), gross product, intermediate consump-
tion (fuel, ice, etc), labour costs (wages and social costs), insurance costs, margin, and 
results, among others. 
 
Unfortunately, we have very poor information on a trip level. 
 
The number of boats covered by the Observatoire depends on the year, but in the da-
tabase approximately 85 to 90 boats can be identified as nephrops trawlers, which 
corresponds to 35% to 40% of the boats in the nephrops fishery. 
 
 
4.3.3.1 Landings composition 
The five most important species for French nephrops trawlers are nephrops, hake, 
sole, monk and megrim. Although they appear not to be so important in terms of 
weight (Table 4.3.3), their value may be (Table 4.3.4). This is due to their high unit 
value compared to the other species (Table 4.3.5). 
 
Among our case studies, the variability of only nephrops and hake landings has been 
studied by IFREMER (Task 5.2). The three other species will therefore be considered 
as not relevant to the different fleets (as well as the different unreported species which 
are aggregated as “Other”). 
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 Table 4.3.3 Percentage landings composition in weight for French Nephrops 
trawlers, base year 2003 
 
Fleet segment  Nephrops Hake Monk Megrim Sole Other
 
< 12m 32.05 17.57 2.78 1.66 4.80 41.14
12-15m 29.03 14.36 5.41 5.08 3.32 42.81
15-18m 24.82 11.63 4.82 4.54 3.68 50.51
18-24m 8.06 4.15 8.16 4.17 3.38 72.08
 
 
 Table 4.3.4  Percentage landings composition in value for French Nephrops trawl-
ers, base year 2003 
 
Fleet segment  Nephrops Hake Monk Megrim Sole Other
 
< 12m 50.05 14.47 3.34 1.60 9.24 21.30
12-15m 49.36 12.10 6.80 5.02 7.09 19.63
15-18m 45.38 10.76 6.93 5.18 8.67 23.08
18-24m 17.39 5.07 13.86 3.79 9.04 50.85
 
 
 Table 4.3.5  Mean landings price (€/kg), base year 2003. 
 
Fleet segment  Nephrops Hake Monk Megrim Sole Other
 
< 12m 7.58 4.00 5.82 4.70 9.34 2.51
12-15m 8.01 3.97 5.93 4.66 10.07 2.16
15-18m 7.70 3.90 6.06 4.81 9.92 1.93
18-24m 7.76 4.39 6.10 3.27 9.61 2.54
 
 
4.3.3.2. Economic performance 
Table 4.3.6 depicts the different economic indicators of the French trawlers involved 
in the nephrops fishery of the Bay of Biscay. The landings values comprise all species 
caught. The variable costs comprise fuel, ice, provisions, landing and sales costs. 
Gross margin is calculated as the difference between the value of landings and vari-
able costs.  
 
The gross margin is shared between the owner and the crew according to a fixed 
share, which is typical of French artisanal fisheries. This has huge implications for the 
CBA, because the hypothetical losses are borne not only by the boat owners but also 
by all the fishermen involved in the fishery. Large losses during the early years could 
result in a loss of fishermen who would shift to other fisheries. In this CBA, such 
movements will be ignored. Therefore, the margin is calculated as the difference be-
tween the owners’ share and the other variables costs. 
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Table 4.3.6 Costs and earnings at vessel level of French vessels targeting Neph-
rops, base year 2003, €000   
 
Fleet segment 
length 
Landings 
value
Variable
 costs *
Gross
margin
Crew 
share**
Other variable 
costs Margin***
 
< 12m 139 20 119 47.68% 34 29
12-15m 263 55 208 49.66% 63 42
15-18m 329 80 248 49.89% 79 46
18-24m 697 224 473 45.55% 180 77
 
* Also called “shared costs”: variable costs, before remuneration of labour and capital  
** The crew share is displayed as a percentage because French fishermen do not receive any fixed wage.  
*** Before remuneration of capital. 
 
 
Prices of nephrops and hake are known by grade (Table 4.3.7). For both species, price 
increases with size. Lowering the mortality for smaller fish should therefore benefit 
fishermen if the price of those fish do not decrease more than the increase in landing 
volume. 
 
Table 4.3.7  Price of Hake and Nephrops according to grade, base 2003 
 
 ---------------- Hake ----------------- ------------- Nephrops ---------------
Grade Price (€/kg) kg per fish Price (€/kg) Age
 
1 8.57 > 2.5 13.43 7+
2 6.88 1.2 - 2.5 12.23 5 - 6
3 5.49 0.6 - 1.2 7.15 3 - 4
4 3.41 0.3 - 0.6 6.68 2
5 2.93 0.2 - 0.3
 
 
4.3.4 Results of the biological simulations 
In the two cases being studied, there is no need to include biological calculations di-
rectly in the CBA (as in the Danish case for example) as they are directly integrated 
as input, based on the different simulations carried out by IFREMER (Task 5.2). 
 
4.3.4.1 Nephrops landings 
These simulations conclude that the selective devices significantly modify nephrops 
production as reported in Figure 4.3.5. The implementation of a square-mesh panel 
(Task 3.11, Table 4.0) or a 200mm bar-spacing grid results in a loss of nephrops in 
the short term (during the first years of implementation), but allows higher production 
in the long term. The combination of a 13mm bar-spacing grid and a square-mesh 
panel allows an increase in production in the long term, while avoiding a large short-
term loss. 
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Figure 4.3.5 Trends in Nephrops landings, tonnes  
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These increases in landings are due to improved gear selectivity, which significantly 
reduces discards of Nephrops. They fall by between two-thirds and three-quarters 
(Figure 4.3.), depending on the selection device used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.3.6: Trends in Nephrops discards, tonnes  
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4.3.4.2. Hake landings 
As reported in Task 5.2, “the side escape panels (Task 3.11) provided mitigated re-
sults on hake escapement while no hake escapement was noted when the nephrops 
grids (Task 3.10) were implemented in the conditions of the tests”. For the CBA, this 
implies that the French nephrops fleet will be the only one to be affected by the im-
plementation of these two selective gears. 
 
IFREMER used other data from the national programme ASCGG in order to test the 
impact on hake stocks of a square-mesh panel on the top of the baitings. 
 
This simulation compares the evolution of hake landings after 2004 between a stan-
dard trawl and trawl with a square-mesh panel. Results show growing production in 
both cases (Figure 4.3.7), which is a consequence of the dynamics of the hake re-
source under constant effort (ICES 2005).  
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Figure 4.3.7 Gain/loss (%) of hake catches after the implementation of a square-
mesh panel in the Nephrops fishery 
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The implementation of a square-mesh panel device in the French nephrops fishery 
will only have a differential gain of 3% in terms of landings, which is weak according 
to the IFREMER conclusions (Task 5.2). This is the result of different factors such as 
the share of nephrops trawlers landings in the whole hake fishery (15% in Areas 
VIIIa, and b, and 5% overall). 
 
For the nephrops trawlers, the implementation of this device would reduce their land-
ings of hake by approximately 15% compared to the simulated status quo. 
4.3.5  Results of the cost-benefit analysis applied to the French Nephrops fishery 
The comparison of the base case, i.e. without gear change, and the case with gear 
change has been performed by use of the same equations as in the Danish case, except 
for crew wages. In the French case, wages are not considered to be constant, but di-
rectly dependent of the gross margin (GM) and a fixed percentage called crew share: 
wages = GM * crew share  
A number of simplifying assumptions have been used which are summarized below: 
 
H:  landings are constant for all species except nephrops and hake. 
P:  fish prices are constant for all species except nephrops and hake, where price 
 is a function of grade  
C:  variable costs are kept constant (except for crew wages as mentioned above). 
G:  fixed costs are kept constant. 
 
 NECESSITY    FOI    95
 V:  external effects (net) are disregarded i.e. for example, discarding is not consid-
 ered ecologically or ethically harmful. 
U:  management costs (information gathering, administration, monitoring, control 
 and enforcement) are kept constant. 
I:  investments costs in gear are assumed to be the same with and without the gear 
change for the implementation of square-mesh panels. Implementing the flexi-
ble grid has a maximum cost of €1,500 per year (the grid has to be replaced 
every year). These €1,500 euros are included in the “Other variable costs”. 
D:  the discount rate is fixed at 5%. 
T:  the time horizon is fixed at 10, 20, and 30 years. 
 
Given these assumptions, the indicator used to calculate the Net Present Value is the 
margin. A net present value based on the gross revenue would give the same result. 
 
The three situations tested by IFREMER were implemented in the CBA framework: 
 
• 13mm grid and a square-mesh window (Table 4.3.8), 
• square-mesh panels (Table 4.3.10), 
• 20mm grid (Table 4.3.11). 
 
The economic implications of the ASCGG trials were also tested (Table 4.3.9). 
 
Table 4.3.8  Net present value of the implementation of a 13mm flexible grid (€000) 
-------------- Vessel level -------------- ----------------- Segment level ----------------
L
 
ength 10 20 30 Length No. of vessels 10 20 30
<12m 12.4 27.1 36.1 <12m 49 609 1328 1769
12-15m 27.9 56.6 74.3 12-15m 75 2093 4247 5569
15-18m 30.4 61.4 80.4 15-18m 87 2646 5341 6996
18-24m 19.9 41.3 54.4 18-24m 12 238 495 653
 
 
Table 4.3.9  Net present value of the ASCGG trials (€000) 
-------------- Vessel level -------------- ----------------- Segment level ----------------
L
 
ength 10 20 30 Length No. of vessels 10 20 30
<12m 7.9 20.3 27.9 <12m 49 388 996 1369
12-15m 21.2 46.6 62.1 12-15m 75 1592 3493 4660
15-18m 23.7 51.3 68.2 15-18m 87 2060 4460 5933
18-24m 14.3 32.9 44.3 18-24m 12 172 395 532
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 Table 4.3.10  Net present value of the implementation of a square-mesh panel (€000) 
-------------- Vessel level -------------- ----------------- Segment level ----------------
Length 10 20 30 Length No. of vessels 10 20 30
 
<12m -4.7 7.9 15.7 <12m 49 -231 388 768
12-15m -0.3 25.1 40.7 12-15m 75 -20 1882 3050
15-18m 0.4 27.9 44.7 15-18m 87 39 2424 3888
18-24m -2.6 16.2 27.7 18-24m 12 -31 194 332
 
 
Table 4.3.11  Net present value of the implementation of a 20mm grid (€000) 
-------------- Vessel level -------------- ----------------- Segment level ----------------
L
 
ength 10 20 30 Length No. of vessels 10 20 30
<12m -3.5 15.2 26.7 <12m 49 -169 745 1306
12-15m 1.8 37.1 58.7 12-15m 75 134 2780 4404
15-18m 2.6 40.6 63.9 15-18m 87 229 3531 5559
18-24m -0.9 25.7 42.0 18-24m 12 -11 308 504
 
 
These four situations have positive NPVs in the mid- and long-term. However, fish-
ermen could be expected to decline to use a square-mesh panel and the 200mm grid 
owing to the loss of margin after 10 years, even if these losses are limited compared 
to the different discounted margin levels. 
Two factors drive these positive results: 
 
• The selective gears reduce the amount of nephrops discards. This has benefi-
cial repercussions on the stock growth, which allow an increase in production 
in the mid-term. 
• The loss of marketable individuals is relatively low in the short term. There-
fore, the fall in the value of landings is limited. 
 
These results have also to be considered with care, considering that the different gears 
tested do not fit the objective of discard reduction assigned by the NECESSITY pro-
ject. 
 
The different costs were assumed to be constant during the 30-year period.  Any in-
crease would reduce the net present value (Table 4.3.12).  
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 Table 4.3.12  Impact of assumptions 
 
 NPV increase NPV decrease
 
C: variable costs increase X
G: fixed costs increase X
V: external effects (net) harmful X
U: management costs increase X
I: investments costs in gear increase X
D: the discount rate increase X
 
 
The discount rate used in these calculations is 5%, which is considered as a standard 
level for many public projects. However, this rate can be fixed between 3.5% and 
20% depending on the source considered. Generally, a private discount rate is esti-
mated to fluctuate between 10% and 20%. In this last case, the NPV would be nega-
tive for all the periods and for every fleet segment (Table 4.3.13).  
 
Table 4.3.13  NPV at vessel level for various discount rates (the case of the 200mm 
grid, €000) 
 
 
 
------------ 3.5% ------------- ------------- 10% ------------- ---------------- 20% -------------
Length 10 20 30 10 20 30 10 20 30
<12m -2.3 20.9 37.3 -6.1 3.2 6.8 -8.4 -5.7 -5.3
12-15m 4.2 48.1 79.2 -4.1 13.6 20.4 -9.7 -4.7 -3.9
15-18m 5.2 52.4 85.9 -3.7 15.2 22.6 -9.9 -4.5 -3.6
18-24m 0.8 33.9 57.4 -5.1 8.2 13.3 -9.0 -5.2 -4.6
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 4.4. The Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea 
4.4.1. General presentation of the fishery 
The scampi prawn, nephrops norwegicus, is found generally in the seas around Italy 
and Greece.  Landings of nephrops from the Adriatic and Aegean are the result of tar-
geted fishing in the Adriatic and targeted fishing and by-catch from the hake fishery, 
among others, in the Aegean.  The fishery for nephrops is relatively small.  Landings 
of 3,654 tonnes were taken from the whole of the Mediterranean Sea in 2003 with the 
Italians being by far the most important players with 80% of the catch; Spain took 
15% and Greece 8%.   
 
Landings of scampi into Italy were worth some €68m in 2003 and amounted to 4,081 
tonnes according to IREPA.  FAO figures show 2,550 tonnes but the discrepancy may 
be due to improved statistical production methods at IREPA. 
 
Figure 4.4.1 Landings of Scampi into Italy from all areas by Italian vessels, 1975 to 
2004 
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Source: FAO 
 
 
The trend shown in Figure 4.4.1 suggests that the fishery enjoyed exceptional land-
ings in the period from the mid-1980s for some ten years but that since then it has re-
turned to more-normal levels of production.  It is not clear whether the trend shown is 
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 the result of changes in the fish stock or a consequence of vessels switching into and 
then out of the nephrops fishery as a result of changes in other stocks. 
 
In 2003, 2,866 tonnes of scampi were taken from the Adriatic.  The breakdown given 
in Table 4.4.1 shows that the fishery is mainly concentrated in the central and south-
ern Adriatic with the region of Puglia dominating supply by providing almost 50% of 
landings. 
 
Table 4.4.1  Landings of Nephrops into Italy from the Adriatic Sea by Italian ves-
sels, by Region, 2003 
 
Region Quantity (Tonnes) Value (€m)
 
Friuli Venezia Giulia - -
Veneto 11 0.4
Emilia Romagna 17 0.7
Marche 655 12.9
Abruzzo e Molise 796 10.3
Puglia 1387 15.8
TOTAL Adriatic Sea 2866 40.1
 
 
This study has been concerned with by-catches of nephrops in the targeted hake fish-
ery.  In order to given some comparison of the relative importance of the species, 
landings of hake by the Italian fleet are shown below in Figure 4.4.2, though the 
reader is reminded that these figures are for the whole of Italy and include all fleets 
regardless of whether the landings have been targeted or are by-catch. 
 
Figure 4.4.2 Landings of Scampi into Italy by from all areas by Italian vessels, 1975 
to 2004 
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 The hake fishery appears to have enjoyed a period of prosperity in the ten years after 
1985, at the same time as the nephrops fishery and Table 4.4.2 shows that, as with 
nephrops, the fishery in the Adriatic Sea is concentrated in the central and southern 
parts. 
 
Table 4.4.2   Landings of Hake into Italy from the Adriatic Sea, by Region, 2003 
 
Region Quantity (Tonnes) Value (€m)
 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 14 0.1
Veneto 135 0.6
Emilia Romagna 283 1.8
Marche 1093 9.4
Abruzzo e Molise 1053 10.5
Puglia 5103 31.0
TOTAL Adriatic Sea 7681 53.4
 
 
The two fisheries are of similar importance in the earning of the Italian fleet. 
4.4.2. Fleet costs and earnings 
 
4.4.2.1. Composition of Landings 
The Italian fishery is characterised by the large number of species, more than 40, that 
provide a significant contribution to the earnings of the fleet.  The six main segments 
of the fleet are shown below in Table 4.4.3.  Mediterranean trawlers, which includes 
the fleets fishing for hake in the Adriatic and Aegean Seas, are the largest contributor 
to earnings with 45% of landings by value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102    FOI    NECESSITY 
 Table 4.4.3  Value of Landings by Vessels Type and Species Group, 2004 (€m) 
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Anchovies 2.3 4.6 2.7 45.4 35.2  90.2
Pilchards 0.7 2.3 1.3 16.1 6.5 26.9
Marine molluscs 86.9 16 120.9 0.4 0.6 81.3 306.2
Marine crustaceans 24.4 8.1 225.5 0.7 0.3 259
Other fish 235.9 137.2 270.7 46.2 7.3  697.4
Total 350.2 168.2 621.1 108.8 49.9 81.3 1,379.70
 
 
The picture of landings volumes, shown in Table 4.4.4, is similar to that of values, 
though the Mediterranean trawlers are responsible for only 35% of landings by vol-
ume, which indicates above average prices for their product.  Nevertheless, they re-
main the most significant segment of the Italian fleet. 
 
Table 4.4.4.  Quantity of Landings by Vessels Type and Species Group, 2004 (000t) 
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Anchovies 0.6 1 3.4 19.9 33.7  58.6
Pilchards 0.4 1 1.2 13.1 6.7 22.4
Marine molluscs 13.5 3.1 19 0.1 23.4 59.1
Marine crustaceans 2 0.8 25.2 28
Other fish 31.9 17.5 53.2 14.4 3.2  120.2
Total 48.4 23.4 102 47.4 43.7 23.4 288.3
 
 
4.4.2.2 Economic Performance 
In general, the Italian fleet, subdivided by fleet segment, remained profitable in 2004.  
The financial results and other statistics relevant to their activity are shown in Table 
4.4.5.  Nephrops are mostly caught by the Mediterranean trawlers with contributions 
from multipurpose vessels and the small-scale fisheries. 
 
The by-catch of nephrops resulting from the targeted fishery for hake is taken by the 
larger vessels which are able to make overnight trips, and voyages of several days 
into the waters east of Greece. 
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 The two trials in the Adriatic and Aegean have not been subjected to Economic Im-
pact Assessment owing to a lack of data on the effect of the gear modifications re-
quired to carry out a CBA and an economic review of the fleets in question. 
 
Table 4.4.5  Economic Performance of the Italian Fleet by Segment, 2004 
 
 ------------------------------------ Fleet segments --------------------------
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Economic indicators (€m) 
Value of landings 1380 350 168 621 109 50 81
Gross cash flow 471 148 63 171 36 16 37
Net profit 368 129 49 120 29 12 29
G
 
ross value-added 871 243 111 348 74 32 64
Other economic indicators 
Employment on board (FTE) 35195 15259 4959 10209 2565 774 1429
Invested capital (€m) 2208 426 271 1157 162 69 124
Effort (000 days at sea) 2205 1353 239 484 37 20 72
 
Capacity indicators 
Volume of landings (000t) 288 48 23 102 48 44 23
Number of vessels 14873 9053 1614 3049 320 124 713
Total GRT (000) 172 23 19 102 15 7 7
Total GT (000) 202 16 21 130 18 9 9
T
 
otal kW (000) 1213 224 182 607 80 42 77
Average characteristics of vessels 
GRT (t) 12 3 12 33 47 53 10
GT (t) 14 2 13 43 56 72 13
Engine Power (Kw) 82 25 113 199 251 341 108
Length (m) 10 7 12 18 20 22 14
Age (Years) 27 30 23 25 25 22 19
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 4.5. The Pelagic Trawl Fishery for Sea Bass in ICES Sub-Areas VIIe, VIIf, 
VIIIa and VIIIb 
4.5.1 General presentation in terms of landings of the fishery covering the trial 
Sea bass (Dicentrarchus Labrax) may be found over an area of the North-East Atlan-
tic Ocean from Norway, to as far south as Senegal, and in the Mediterranean Sea.  
The fishery for sea bass in ICES sub-areas VIIe and VIIf, and VIIIa and VIIIb is ex-
ploited by the vessels of four countries – the Channel Islands, France, Spain and the 
United Kingdom.  The Channel Islands are outside the European Union.  The relevant 
ICES sub-areas are shown below in Figure 4.5.1.  Their defining characteristics are 
that they are essentially coastal and relatively small. 
 
Figure 4.5.1 Map of Sea Areas defined by the International Council for the Explora-
tion of the Sea 
  
Source: ICES 
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 Not unnaturally, since its coast abuts three of the four sub-areas, France is by far the 
most dominant among them, landings 87% of the total catch of 3,849 tonnes in 2003, 
the latest year for which complete figures are available.   
 
Price data available is even more limited, but using the British average price prevail-
ing in 2004 suggests a significant fishery worth some €40million a year.  Figure 4.5.2 
shows the development of landings of each country’s vessels from the four sub-areas. 
 
Figure 4.5.2  Landings of Sea Bass by Country from ICES Sub-Areas VIIe, VIIf, VIIIa 
and VIIIb, 1973 to 2003  
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Note that in this and subsequent figures, the exceptionally low figure for 1999 is due 
to the French landings not being recorded that year.  Similarly, there are other omis-
sions and indications of erratic reporting not only from France but also from else-
where.  Nevertheless, the general impressions created by the data appear to be a re-
flection of a steadily increasing size and relative importance of the fishery.  Indeed, 
over the last thirty years the fishery appears to have tripled in size when measured in 
landings, though it is probable that the price has been driven down by the increased 
availability of farmed sea bass from the Mediterranean, so that the economic contri-
bution may not have increased so dramatically.  On the other hand, the contribution of 
factor rents from employment and servicing the fleets in a time of cut-backs in other 
fisheries must not be overlooked. 
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 Figure 4.5.3 shows the trend in landings of sea bass by sub-area.  The concentration 
of landings is much less marked among the sub-areas than between the countries.   
 
Sub-area VIIIa is the most important providing 55% of landings in 2003 while sub-
area VIIe offered 23% and VIIIb 19%.  Sub-area VIIf has never provided a large pro-
portion of the catch but thirty years ago the other three sub-areas were of similar im-
portance to each other, though in total the fishery was smaller than that in sub-area 
VIIIa alone now is.   
 
The principal growth in the fishery has been in sub-areas VIIe and VIIIa and in the 
last ten years sub-area VIIe has shown a decline.  Some caution needs to be exercised 
with the minutiae of the trends, however, since these could simply reflect improve-
ments in data recording. 
 
Figure 4.5.3  Landings of Sea Bass by Sub-Area, 1973 to 2003  
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In the United Kingdom, the sea bass fishery has been growing in importance as a sub-
stitute available to fleets under growing pressure where their fisheries have been in 
decline or subjected to increasing restrictions on quotas and activity.  The strong price 
now being fetched makes it an attractive target see figure 4.5.4.   
 
Complementing this effect, demand for the product has increased as consumers have 
been introduced to it through its increased availability from fish farms and as a result 
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 of consumption while holidaying in the Mediterranean countries.  With growing de-
mand promoting strong prices, the sea bass fishery might have displaced other less 
lucrative pelagic fisheries even without pressure on the TACs and quotas of the other 
species. 
 
Figure 4.5.4 Shows the progression of landings of sea bass into the United King-
dom by British vessels for the last thirty years. 
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While sea bass may be caught all round the British Isles, the fishery is mainly located 
in the Bristol and English Channels (sub-areas VIIe and VIIf) and the northern Bay of 
Biscay (sub-areas VIIIa and VIIIb).    These four sub-areas offered about 50% of the 
600 tonnes of sea bass landed in 2003. 
 
The bulk of landings by British vessels from the four sub-areas is taken from sub-area 
VIIe, some 80%, though sub-area VIIf remains important, providing virtually all the 
remaining 20%.  It can be readily seen from Figure 4.5.5 that the sub-areas in the Bay 
of Biscay are of little or no significance to the British fleet fishing for sea bass and 
provided only 2 tonnes in total in the first three years of the new century. 
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Figure 4.5.5:  Landings of Sea Bass by British Vessels by Sub-Area, 1973 to 2003 
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The sea bass fishery forms part of a wider pelagic fishery and vessels derive their in-
come by switching product as they become seasonally available.  The sea bass fishery 
is a winter operation.   
 
Sea bass is an important sport fish and angling accounts for a substantial catch in ad-
dition to the commercial landings.  Information on the extent of these landings is very 
limited. 
 
The number of vessels in the commercial fishery has recently declined sharply.  In 
2003 there were estimated to have been about 20 pair trawlers, most of which had 
travelled from Scotland, and a handful of local vessels.  By the end of the season in 
2007, this number had declined to six with perhaps a dozen local vessels.  The num-
ber of vessels reflects the progress of the stock, which has declined noticeably and 
which is now the subject of ongoing discussions regarding plans to protect it. 
 
There is no annual Total Allowable Catch for sea bass set by the European Union un-
der the Common Fisheries Policy and therefore no national quotas among the nations 
prosecuting the fishery.  Similarly, the fishery has not been brought within the Fishing 
Effort scheme of the CFP and so there are no limitations on the days a vessel may 
spend at sea fishing for sea bass.   
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However, it is necessary to hold a licence permitting exploitation of the stocks for 
commercial purposes and the fishery is also subject to Technical Conservation Meas-
ures under the CFP.  These comprise protection of nursery areas, and minimum land-
ings sizes for individual specimens. 
 
European Union vessels may fish in any area outside national 12-mile limits and in-
side the limits of their own member states but not within a number of designated 
nursery areas.  These comprise river estuaries, creeks and harbours inshore in south-
ern England where juvenile stocks congregate.   
 
Until recently, there had been little concern for the future of sea bass stocks but the 
increased commercial exploitation visible in Figure 4.5.4 and considerable recrea-
tional activity by anglers has led to growing disquiet.  This has caused a minimum 
landing size to be introduced which was increased on 6th April 2007 from 36cm to 
40cm.  The British Fisheries Minister announced that he intends to increase the mini-
mum landing size to 45cm in 2010, subject to a review of the success of the 2007 in-
crease.  Accompanying this measure is an increase in the minimum mesh-size for 
fixed gear for targeted sea bass fisheries from 90mm to 100mm.  A report from the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit had recommended that the sea bass fishery should be 
reserved exclusively for recreational sea angling7. 
 
Other management measures in the fishery arise from attempts to overcome external-
ities created by commercial fishing using pelagic trawl nets.  These also trap cetace-
ans (whales, dolphins and porpoises), mostly dolphins, and there has been growing 
concern that the impact has reached a level which is unacceptable.  Greenpeace, not 
an independent source, has estimated that there may be more than 2,000 dolphins a 
year being killed after becoming trapped in pair-trawl nets8.   
 
Pingers trialled on the pair-trawl nets were found to be ineffective in deterring dol-
phins from entering the nets and experiments are reported elsewhere in this report of 
attempts to design separator or exclusion devises to allow them to escape.  In the light 
of the problem, the British government has banned pair trawling for sea bass inside 
the 12 nautical mile limit of British territorial waters. 
 
__________________________________ 
7 Net Benefits: a sustainable and profitable future for UK fishing, Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 
Cabinet Office, London, March 2004. 
 
8 Cetacean by-catch and pelagic trawling, Greenpeace, July 2005. 
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There is also an albacore fishery in these sea areas which is prone to catching cetace-
ans.  Figure 4.5.6 shows that, while the fishery is substantial, it is no longer of impor-
tance to the British fleet, though it was prosecuted with some success throughout the 
1990s. 
 
Figure 4.5.6 Landings of Albacore by Country from ICES Sub-Areas VIIe, VIIf, VIIIa 
and VIIIb, 1973 to 2003 
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The principal participants are French and Spanish fleets reflecting the sources of the 
catches which are almost entirely in ICES sub-areas VIIIa and VIIIb as shown in Fig-
ure 4.5.7. 
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Figure 4.5.7 Landings of Albacore by ICES Sub-Area, 1973 to 2003 
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4.5.2  Fleets costs and earnings 
 
4.5.2.1  Landings composition  
The British pelagic fleet relies for its income on a small number of species.  The pair 
trawl fishery for sea bass off the south-west of England is fished mainly by Scots ves-
sels.  The Scottish pelagic fleet has a history going back hundreds of years of travel-
ling around the British coast to fish for herring and mackerel using drift nets and 
though the vessels and fishing methods have changed the willingness to sail long dis-
tances from the home port in search of a viable fishery has not. 
 
The trends in the dependency of the British pelagic fleet on different species is shown 
in Figure 4.5.8 which indicates landings from all North East Atlantic waters including 
the North Sea, Irish Sea, Bristol Channel and English Channel, as well as west of 
Scotland.  Because of the practice of travelling, it is not sensible to try to separate the 
localities from the point of view of fleet earnings since they all contribute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.5.8  Landings of Pelagic Species from all North East Atlantic Waters, 1973 
to 2004 
 
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
Tonnes
Albacore Herring HorseMackerel Mackerel
Pilchard(=Sardine) Sea Bass Sprat
 
 
 
In Figure 4.5.8, the quantity of sea bass can hardly be distinguished from the axis but 
this does not reflect its importance to the fleet.   
 
Table 4.5.1 shows the contribution of the pelagic species to the earnings from land-
ings of the whole British fleet wherever caught.  The fleet is heavily dependent on 
mackerel and to a lesser extent herring. At the national level, sea bass ranks third in 
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 importance among the pelagic species, measured by the value of landings, and yet 
still only provides just over 3% of the revenue from pelagic species. 
 
Table 4.5.1  Contribution of Species to the Earnings of the British Pelagic Fleet, 
2004 
 
Per Cent Quantity Value
 
Albacore 0.0 0.0
Herring 33.2 14.0
Horse Mackerel 4.2 2.1
Mackerel 59.9 78.2
Pilchard (Sardine) 0.9 1.4
Sea Bass 0.2 3.1
Sprat 1.3 0.7
Other 0.4 0.6
Total 100.0 100.0
 
 
The situation is less dramatic in the fishery under investigation in that sea bass is the 
leading pelagic species providing nearly 30% of the fleet income but the dependence 
on a few species is less marked.  This is shown in Table 4.5.2. This means that the 
fishery is less vulnerable to the loss of its principle species than must be the case in 
other parts of the British pelagic fishery.   
 
Table 4.5.2 Contribution of Species Caught in ICES Sub-Areas VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg, 
VIIIa and VIIIb to the Earnings of the British Pelagic Fleet, 2004 
 
Per Cent Quantity Value
 
Albacore 0.0 0.0
Herring 23.9 15.2
Horse Mackerel 27.6 11.8
Mackerel 27.5 22.1
Pilchard (Sardine) 13.3 16.8
Sea Bass 2.8 29.1
Sprat 4.4 3.1
Other 0.4 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0
 
 
Further disaggregation of pelagic landings and their value made from ICES sub-areas 
VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg, VIIIa and VIIIb, is shown in Table 4.5.3, but no complete de-
composition can be shown as the data are published at the level of aggregation re-
ported.  Further disaggregation is therefore impossible. 
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 Table 4.5.3  Contribution of Species to the Earnings of the British Fleet from 
 ICES Sub-Areas VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg, VIIIa and VIIIb, 2004 
 
 VIIdefg VIIIab Total 
P
 
er  Cent Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value
Albacore 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Herring 28.3 16.8 0.0 0.0 23.9 15.2
Horse Mackerel 29.4 11.8 17.6 12.3 27.6 11.8
Mackerel 17.5 15.8 82.0 83.4 27.5 22.1
Pilchard (Sardine) 15.7 18.6 0.0 0.0 13.3 16.8
Sea Bass 3.3 31.7 0.2 3.9 2.8 29.1
Sprat 5.2 3.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 3.1
Other 0.5 2.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 
 
In the sea areas abutting the English coast, sub-areas VIId, VIIe, VIIf and VIIg, corre-
sponding to the English Channel, the Bristol Channel and the Celtic Sea, sea bass ap-
pears one of the least important by tonnage, but by value, it is the leading species.   
 
The actual level of landings by tonne rather than the percentages shown above are 
given in Table 4.5.4 below. 
 
Table 4.5.4  Landings by the British Fleet from ICES Sub-Areas VIId, VIIe, VIIf, 
 VIIg, VIIIa and VIIIb, 2004 
 
Quantities (Tonnes) VIIdefg VIIIab Total
 
Albacore 0 0 0
Herring 4,521 0 4,521
Horse Mackerel 4,700 516 5,216
Mackerel 2,797 2,403 5,200
Pilchard (Sardine) 2,512 0 2,512
Sea Bass 528 7 535
Sprat 836 0 836
Other 73 3 76
Total 15,967 2,929 18,896
 
 
The corresponding values of landings are given in Table 4.5.5. 
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 Table 4.5.5   Value of Landings by the British Fleet from ICES Sub-Areas VIId, 
 VIIe, VIIf, VIIg, VIIIa and VIIIb, 2004 
 
Values (€000) VIIdefg VIIIab Total
 
Albacore 0 0 0
Herring 2,002 0 2,002
Horse Mackerel 1,403 152 1,554
Mackerel 1,878 1,028 2,906
Pilchard (Sardine) 2,214 0 2,214
Sea Bass 3,781 49 3,830
Sprat 403 0 403
Other 233 4 237
Total 11,913 1,233 13,146
 
 
By dividing the values given in Table 4.5.5 by the corresponding quantities reported 
in Table 4.5.4, it is possible to determine a mean annual price for each of the species 
for the year 2004.  These are given in Table 4.5.6.  The different nature of the market 
for sea bass is spectacularly underlined by the huge difference in price between it and 
the other pelagic species.  It fetches nearly 9 times the price of the nearest, the pil-
chard, because it goes largely to the restaurant end of the catering trade. 
 
Table 4.5.6 Average Prices Fetched by Landings by the British Fleet from ICES 
Sub-Areas VIId, VIIe, VIIf, VIIg, VIIIa and VIIIb, 2004 
 
 
 
Prices (€ per Tonne) VIIdefg VIIIab Total
Albacore 0 0 0
Herring 443 0 443
Horse Mackerel 298 294 298
Mackerel 671 428 559
Pilchard(=Sardine) 881 0 881
Sea Bass 7,161 6,946 7,158
Sprat 482 0 482
 
 
4.5.3 Economic performance 
No survey of the British pelagic fleet has been completed in the last 20 years or more 
and it is not possible to be certain of the costs and earnings of the fleet.  In addition, 
the fleet has changed it fishing methods very rapidly from drift netting, since the 
1960s when the power block was invented to purse seining, to pair trawl and most re-
cently to pelagic mid-water single trawling.  The effect of this would mean that were 
there any costs and earnings data they would rapidly have become obsolete.  How-
ever, given the nature of the fishing methods used, and practice in other fisheries, we 
have created an imputed set of costs and earnings figures for the fleet.  In some ways 
this is more valuable than reproducing the financial performance directly as it allows 
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 us to isolate the sea bass fishery and attribute costs to it on the basis of a percentage of 
sales revenue.   
 
Operating costs in a fishery of this nature are normally reported to amount to between 
55% and 65% of earnings and we have chosen the mid-point with an increment to 
63% owing to the recent steep rise in fuel oil prices.  Fuel oil is included as absorbing 
20% of earnings.  Crew share normally accounts for about 30% of earnings and that 
figure is used here.  A figure of 10% has been allowed for depreciation.  Since depre-
ciation is assumed to cover the write-off cost of a vessel, it is assumed that no mort-
gage is needed and a historically profitable vessel will not require an overdraft for any 
other purpose; therefore a zero amount for interest is included.  The remainder, 17%, 
represents vessels costs such as insurance, equipment and the like, see Table 4.5.7.  
 
The most difficult figure to determine is the profit after all costs including deprecia-
tion have been met.  The impression, and it is only an impression, is that the fishery 
has been performing better than its demersal counterpart.  In recent years, there have 
been fewer problems with stock abundance, although they are by no means absent, 
and the fleet has operated for some time on a system of quota trading suggesting that 
it is relatively economically efficient.  There have been adequate funds for the fleet to 
be modernised.  On the other hand, if the fishery were so much more profitable than 
its counterparts there would be a rush to buy licences and quota to take part.  Their 
value would reflect the profitability and capitalise it, reducing the level of profitability 
to normal levels for the purchasers.  We have therefore assumed a level of 10% to 
represent the pure return to capital. 
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 Table 4.5.7 United Kingdom: National Pelagic Fleet, imputed economic and ca-
pacity indicators, 2004 
 
 €000 Percentage of Sales
 
Value of landings 3830.0 100.0
Fuel costs 766.0 20.0
Other running costs 497.9 13.0
Vessel costs 651.1 17.0
Crew share 1149.0 30.0
Gross cash flow 766.0  
Depreciation 383.0 10.0
Interest 0.0 0.0
Net profit 383.0 10.0
Gross value-added 1915.0  
Employment on board (FTE) 120  
Invested capital (€m)   
Effort (1000 days-at-sea)   
Volume of landings (Tonnes) 535.0  
Fleet - number of vessels 20  
Fleet - total GRT (1000)   
Fleet - total GT (1000)   
Fleet - total kW (1000)   
 
 
Employment on board has been derived on the basis of a vessel spending three full 
months a year in the fishery for a crew member whose annual share is a fraction under 
€40,000.  This gives a total employment over the three months of 120 crew and 20 
vessels each with a crew of six. 
4.5.4 The Cost-Benefit Analysis Model 
The absence of a clear set of costs due to the extended research needed to develop 
successful separator gear means that a cost-benefit analysis based on findings from 
trials cannot be performed.  The same may be said of the other methods of economic 
assessment set out earlier in this report. 
 
However, it is possible in spite of this difficulty to make two advances in preparation 
for the availability of the necessary information.  First, it is possible to develop the 
cost-benefit analysis software in the form of a spreadsheet which identifies the gains 
and losses that will go into determining the economic consequences of the use of 
separator gear.  These will be both tangible, capable of being calculated as they are 
based on firm data, and intangible.  Secondly, it is possible to use the spreadsheet as a 
model to determine, under a variety of scenarios, the levels of each of the tangible 
variables that are necessary for the conversion to separator gears to be deemed an 
economic success.  Given that the fleets face only increased costs, the benefits must 
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 be from the fishermen’s utility in not killing cetaceans and that also of society as a 
whole. 
 
One of the primary difficulties that may occur with assessing the viability in socio-
economic terms of the installation of separator or acoustic device is of having suffi-
cient experience from history of the likely effect of, for example, changes in tourism 
levels that may accrue.  Even where there is previous experience, the potential effect 
on tourism or the other benefits may be well outside the sample space of previous ob-
servation.   
 
A possible approach when there is a scarcity of information is to change the question 
so that an observer may offer a qualitative answer.  Hence, it is possible to determine 
what level of improvement in the earnings of tourism might be necessary for the cost-
benefit analysis to break even.  Then the observer could offer an opinion that the im-
provement is likely, of marginal likelihood, or unlikely. 
 
A series of Tables below shows the results of using the socio-economic cost-benefit 
model in this way. 
 
The factors assumed are given in Table 4.5.8.  It is assumed that the downstream sup-
ply-driven output multiplier for the tourist industry is 1.8.  This means that the effect 
of purchasing by the Tourist industry will be increased by a further 0.8 as a result of 
additional rounds of expenditure.  The demand-driven output multiplier is 2.2, mean-
ing that a further €1.20 will be spent upstream for each initial increment of €1.00.  It 
is assumed that all commercially sold sea bass are caught by pelagic trawlers. 
 
An inflation rate of 4% is assumed and returns are discounted at a social time prefer-
ence rate of 5%. 
 
Towing the new gear or devices adds only infinitesimally to the amount of fuel used 
and the acoustic devices cost €300 (two are needed at €150 each).  It is assumed that 
they need to be replaced annually.  There is a crew of six to each vessel in the fleet.  
90% of the 200 dolphins currently killed are assumed to escape and the contingent 
value of a dolphin is put at a nominal €1.00.  The earnings are discounted over a pe-
riod of twenty years.  At a discount rate of 5% the contribution of each successive 
year after twenty years to earnings would be negligible. 
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Table 4.5.8 Factors Assumed in the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Downstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 1.80
Upstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 2.20
Tourism Factor (for solver) 1.78
Inflation Rate 4.00
Discount Rate 5.00
Fuel Increase% 0.00
Cost of Gear per year €000 0.30
Crew Size 6
No of Dolphins Killed per year by UK fleet at present 200
% of Dolphins Saved by Separator Gear 90.00
Value of a Dolphin (€) 1.00
 
 
The model solves by changing the tourism factor to a level which sets the internal rate 
of return at zero, and the result is shown in Table 4.5.9.  This shows the minimum 
level of annual earnings needed from tourism to compensate for the cost of the gear 
change.  It should be noted, however, that the benefits accrue to society and tourism, 
but remain as a loss to the fishing industry.  Note that a learning effect has been al-
lowed for in the level of earnings from tourism whereby the earnings grow logarith-
mically with diminishing returns to time. 
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Table 4.5.9   Required Improvement in Tourism to Compensate for Cost of Gear Changes 
 
NETT PRESENT VALUE AND INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN FOR SEA BASS FISHERY USING ACOUSTIC DEVICES 
€000s            
S
e
a
s
o
n
 
E
n
d
i
n
g
 
Y
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
 
G
e
a
r
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
n
-
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
C
O
S
T
 
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
T
o
u
r
-
i
s
m
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
T
o
u
r
-
i
s
m
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
 
P
e
r
-
s
o
n
a
l
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
 
P
e
r
-
s
o
n
a
l
 
U
t
i
l
i
t
y
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
M
u
l
t
i
p
l
i
e
r
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
T
O
T
A
L
 
B
E
N
E
F
I
T
S
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
N
E
T
T
 
B
E
N
E
F
I
T
S
 
(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
)
 
2008 1 1.00 6.0 12.0 18.0 18.0 1.8 1.8 0.1 0.1 5.3 7.2 -10.8
2009 2 0.95 6.0 5.7 11.7 11.1 2.4 2.3 0.2 0.2 6.8 9.2 -1.9
2010 3 0.90 5.7 5.7 11.4 10.3 2.7 2.5 0.2 0.2 7.4 10.1 -0.2
2011 4 0.86 5.7 5.7 11.4 9.8 2.9 2.5 0.2 0.2 7.6 10.3 0.5
2012 5 0.81 5.7 5.7 11.4 9.3 3.1 2.5 0.2 0.1 7.5 10.1 0.8
2013 6 0.77 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.8 3.1 2.4 0.2 0.1 7.2 9.8 0.9
2014 7 0.74 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.4 3.1 2.3 0.2 0.1 6.9 9.4 1.0
2015 8 0.70 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.0 3.2 2.2 0.2 0.1 6.6 8.9 1.0
2016 9 0.66 5.7 5.7 11.4 7.6 3.2 2.1 0.2 0.1 6.3 8.5 0.9
2017 10 0.63 5.7 5.7 11.4 7.2 3.2 2.0 0.2 0.1 6.0 8.1 0.9
2018 11 0.60 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.8 3.2 1.9 0.2 0.1 5.7 7.7 0.9
2019 12 0.57 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.5 3.2 1.8 0.2 0.1 5.4 7.3 0.8
2020 13 0.54 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.2 3.2 1.7 0.2 0.1 5.1 6.9 0.8
2021 14 0.51 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.9 3.2 1.6 0.2 0.1 4.9 6.6 0.7
2022 15 0.49 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.6 3.2 1.5 0.2 0.1 4.6 6.3 0.7
2023 16 0.46 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.3 3.2 1.5 0.2 0.1 4.4 6.0 0.7
2024 17 0.44 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.0 3.2 1.4 0.2 0.1 4.2 5.7 0.6
2025 18 0.42 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.8 3.2 1.3 0.2 0.1 4.0 5.4 0.6
2026 19 0.40 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.5 3.2 1.3 0.2 0.1 3.8 5.1 0.6
2027 20 0.38 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.3 3.2 1.2 0.2 0.1 3.6 4.8 0.5
Total  114.6 120.3 234.9 153.2 60.3 37.7 3.5 2.2 113.2 153.2 0.0
 
 Nett Present Value (€m) = 0.0
 Internal Rate of Return = 0%
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A different question is dealt with in Tables 4.5.10 and 4.5.11.  Here the estimate is of 
the minimum value a dolphin needs to have in the minds of the public for the use of 
the acoustic devices to become viable.  It is assumed that there is no return from im-
proved tourism and that towing the device through the water adds nothing to vessel 
fuel costs. 
 
Table 4.5.10  The Valuation of a Dolphin 
 
Downstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 1.80
Upstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 2.20
Tourism Factor (for solver) 0.00
Inflation Rate 4.00
Discount Rate 5.00
Fuel Increase% 0.00
Cost of Gear per year €000 0.30
Crew Size 6
No of Dolphins Killed per year by UK fleet at present 200
% of Dolphins Saved by Separator Gear 90.00
Value of a Dolphin (€) 69.00
 
 
This suggests that each dolphin would have to be worth €69 or more in the eyes of the 
public for the use of acoustic devices to be economically viable.  Below that figure, 
using acoustic devices would amount to a cost to society9.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________ 
9 It must be emphasised that these figures are fictitious and should not be quoted as genuine.  They 
arise from a series of postulated costs and benefits designed with no other purpose than to show the 
capabilities of the cost-benefit analysis model. 
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Table 4.5.11  Required Value of a Dolphin to Compensate for Cost of Gear Changes 
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2008 1 1.00 6.0 12.0 18.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 6.2 6.2 0.0 6.2 -11.8
2009 2 0.95 6.0 5.7 11.7 11.1 0.0 0.0 12.4 11.8 0.0 11.8 0.7
2010 3 0.90 5.7 5.7 11.4 10.3 0.0 0.0 12.4 11.2 0.0 11.2 0.9
2011 4 0.86 5.7 5.7 11.4 9.8 0.0 0.0 12.4 10.6 0.0 10.6 0.9
2012 5 0.81 5.7 5.7 11.4 9.3 0.0 0.0 12.4 10.1 0.0 10.1 0.8
2013 6 0.77 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.8 0.0 0.0 12.4 9.6 0.0 9.6 0.8
2014 7 0.74 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.4 0.0 0.0 12.4 9.1 0.0 9.1 0.8
2015 8 0.70 5.7 5.7 11.4 8.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 8.7 0.0 8.7 0.7
2016 9 0.66 5.7 5.7 11.4 7.6 0.0 0.0 12.4 8.2 0.0 8.2 0.7
2017 10 0.63 5.7 5.7 11.4 7.2 0.0 0.0 12.4 7.8 0.0 7.8 0.6
2018 11 0.60 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.8 0.0 0.0 12.4 7.4 0.0 7.4 0.6
2019 12 0.57 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.5 0.0 0.0 12.4 7.1 0.0 7.1 0.6
2020 13 0.54 5.7 5.7 11.4 6.2 0.0 0.0 12.4 6.7 0.0 6.7 0.6
2021 14 0.51 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.9 0.0 0.0 12.4 6.4 0.0 6.4 0.5
2022 15 0.49 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.6 0.0 0.0 12.4 6.1 0.0 6.1 0.5
2023 16 0.46 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.3 0.0 0.0 12.4 5.8 0.0 5.8 0.5
2024 17 0.44 5.7 5.7 11.4 5.0 0.0 0.0 12.4 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.4
2025 18 0.42 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.8 0.0 0.0 12.4 5.2 0.0 5.2 0.4
2026 19 0.40 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.5 0.0 0.0 12.4 4.9 0.0 4.9 0.4
2027 20 0.38 5.7 5.7 11.4 4.3 0.0 0.0 12.4 4.7 0.0 4.7 0.4
Total 114.6 120.3 234.9 153.2 0.0 0.0 242.2 153.2 0.0 153.2 0.0
 
 Nett Present Value (€m) = 0.0
  Internal Rate of Return = 0%
 
 
 
 
 Table 4.5.12 and 4.5.13 show yet another way of using the cost-benefit analysis 
model.  Here the break-even factors have been used to set up the model in order to 
calculate a present value for the net benefits of using acoustic devices on the assump-
tion that each of the minimum requirements is achieved.  Thus the tourism factor is 
set at 1.78 and the value of dolphins at €69.00 each.  It has also been assumed that 
towing the acoustic devices adds 1% to fuel costs – this is probably vastly overstated 
but is included to show the potential for a broader study of the potential impact of 
conservation-friendly gear constructions. 
 
Table 4.5.12  Factors Used in Calculating a Present Value and Internal Rate of Re-
 turn 
 
Downstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 1.80
Upstream Output Multiplier (Tourism) 2.20
Tourism Factor (for solver) 1.78
Inflation Rate 4.00
Discount Rate 5.00
Fuel Increase% 1.00
Cost of Gear per year €000 0.30
Crew Size 6
No of Dolphins Killed per year by UK fleet at present 200
% of Dolphins Saved by Separator Gear 90.00
Value of a Dolphin (€) 69.00
 
 
The impact estimated on the fleet and on the individual participants is also shown in 
Tables 4.5.14 and 4.5.15. 
 
Finally, a socio-economic Balance Sheet may be drawn up of the costs and benefits.  
One such balance sheet is shown as Table 4.5.16 for the example given in Tables 
4.5.12 and 4.5.13. 
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Table 4.5.13  Nett Present Value and Internal Rate of Return Calculations 
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2008 1 1.00 13.7 12.0 25.7 25.7 1.8 1.8 6.2 6.2 5.3 13.3 -12.3
2009 2 0.95 13.7 5.7 19.4 18.4 2.4 2.3 12.4 11.8 6.8 20.8 2.4
2010 3 0.90 13.4 5.7 19.1 17.2 2.7 2.5 12.4 11.2 7.4 21.1 3.9
2011 4 0.86 13.4 5.7 19.1 16.3 2.9 2.5 12.4 10.6 7.6 20.8 4.4
2012 5 0.81 13.4 5.7 19.1 15.5 3.1 2.5 12.4 10.1 7.5 20.1 4.5
2013 6 0.77 13.4 5.7 19.1 14.7 3.1 2.4 12.4 9.6 7.2 19.2 4.5
2014 7 0.74 13.4 5.7 19.1 14.0 3.1 2.3 12.4 9.1 6.9 18.4 4.4
2015 8 0.70 13.4 5.7 19.1 13.3 3.2 2.2 12.4 8.7 6.6 17.5 4.2
2016 9 0.66 13.4 5.7 19.1 12.6 3.2 2.1 12.4 8.2 6.3 16.6 4.0
2017 10 0.63 13.4 5.7 19.1 12.0 3.2 2.0 12.4 7.8 6.0 15.8 3.8
2018 11 0.60 13.4 5.7 19.1 11.4 3.2 1.9 12.4 7.4 5.7 15.0 3.6
2019 12 0.57 13.4 5.7 19.1 10.8 3.2 1.8 12.4 7.1 5.4 14.3 3.4
2020 13 0.54 13.4 5.7 19.1 10.3 3.2 1.7 12.4 6.7 5.1 13.6 3.3
2021 14 0.51 13.4 5.7 19.1 9.8 3.2 1.6 12.4 6.4 4.9 12.9 3.1
2022 15 0.49 13.4 5.7 19.1 9.3 3.2 1.5 12.4 6.1 4.6 12.2 2.9
2023 16 0.46 13.4 5.7 19.1 8.8 3.2 1.5 12.4 5.8 4.4 11.6 2.8
2024 17 0.44 13.4 5.7 19.1 8.4 3.2 1.4 12.4 5.5 4.2 11.0 2.7
2025 18 0.42 13.4 5.7 19.1 8.0 3.2 1.3 12.4 5.2 4.0 10.5 2.5
2026 19 0.40 13.4 5.7 19.1 7.6 3.2 1.3 12.4 4.9 3.8 10.0 2.4
2027 20 0.38 13.4 5.7 19.1 7.2 3.2 1.2 12.4 4.7 3.6 9.5 2.3
Total 267.8 120.3 388.1 251.4 60.3 37.8 242.2 153.1 113.3 304.2 52.8
 Nett Present Value (€m) = 52.8
  Internal Rate of Return = 30%
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Table 4.5.14  Fleet Performance 
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2007 3830.0 766.0 497.9 651.1 1149.0 766.0 383.0 0.0 383.0 1915.0 120.0 535.0 20.0
2008 3830.0 773.7 497.9 663.1 1149.0 746.3 383.0 0.0 363.3 1895.3 120.0 535.0 20.0
2009 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2010 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2011 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2012 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2013 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2014 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2015 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2016 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2017 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2018 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2019 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2020 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2021 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2022 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2023 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2024 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2025 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2026 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
2027 3830.0 773.7 497.9 656.8 1149.0 752.6 383.0 0.0 369.6 1901.6 114.0 535.0 19.0
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Table 4.5.15  Individual Vessel Performance 
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2007 191.5 38.3 24.9 32.6 57.5 38.3 19.2 0.0 19.2 95.8 6.0 26.8 1.0
2008 191.5 39.1 24.9 33.2 57.5 36.9 19.2 0.0 17.8 94.4 6.0 26.8 1.0
2009 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2010 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2011 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2012 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2013 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2014 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2015 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2016 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2017 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2018 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2019 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2020 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2021 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2022 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2023 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2024 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2025 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2026 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
2027 201.6 40.7 26.2 34.6 60.5 39.6 20.2 0.0 19.5 100.1 6.0 28.2 1.0
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4.5.16  Balance Sheet of the Costs and Benefits Arising from Introduction of 
 Separator Gear 
      
COSTS     
 Cost of Gear  171.998  
  Extra Fuel  79.433  
   Sub Total  251.430
      
   TOTAL  251.430
      
      
BENEFITS     
  Value of Cetaceans  153.142  
  Tourism  37.761  
   Sub-Total  190.904
  Multiplier Effects  113.284  
   Sub-Total  113.284
      
   TOTAL  304.188
      
      
BALANCE 52.758Net percent value   
 
Source: Table 4.5.13. 
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 4.6. Alternative gear for reduction of by-catch of cetaceans by Dutch Pelagic 
Freezer Trawlers 
4.6.1. General presentation of the fishery  
Dutch pelagic freezer trawlers fish in EU waters as well as those off West Africa 
(Mauritania and Morocco). The most important target species are herring, horse 
mackerel, mackerel and blue whiting in EU waters and sardinellas and sardines in Af-
rican waters. 
 
In 2005, the number of vessels in the pelagic freezer trawler segment fell from 17 to 
15 at the end of the year (Table 4.6.1). During the year 2005, 16 vessels took part in 
the fisheries and the results presented in this report are based on this number of ves-
sels. With 85,000 kiloWatts (kW) this segment of the Dutch fishing fleet accounted 
for 28% of total Dutch kW. In 2005, total effort of the segment decreased by 10% 
while effort in African waters decreased to 32% (2004: 43%). The total number of 
days at sea decreased to 4,200 in 2005. All catches were landed frozen by the vessels 
and the volume of landings in 2005 increased by more than 5% to 468,000 tonnes of 
pelagic fish. Total employment on board the vessels decreased in 2005 by almost 9% 
and varied during the last few years between 560 and 613 persons.   
 
Table 4.6.1  Dutch pelagic freezer trawlers: main indicators 
 
Indicator 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Employment on board 586 613 613 560
Invested capital (€m) 209 209 210 185
Effort days-at-sea (000) 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.2
Volume of landings (000 tonnes) 368 441 444 468
Fleet - number of vessels 17 17 17 15
Fleet - total GRT (000) 90 90 90 79
Fleet - total kW (000) 99 99 99 85
4.6.2. Economic performance 
 
4.6.2.1. Landings composition  
Total landings in 2005 of the Dutch pelagic freezer trawler fleet amounted to 468,000 
tonnes of fish. Table 4.6.2 shows that, by volume, blue whiting and herring were the 
most important species for the fleet in 2005. These species covered 55% of total land-
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 ings. Horse mackerel and sardinellas were also important species which together ac-
counted for 31% of the volume of landings. Herring and blue whiting have been more 
important since 2002 while landings of mackerel decreased during the last four years. 
Landings of sardinellas fluctuated considerably during this period. 
 
Table 4.6.2  Volume of landings (000 tonnes) 
 
Species 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
Herring 69 94 126 125
Horse mackerel 67 77 90 73
Mackerel 52 48 35 28
Blue whiting 38 59 78 130
Sardinellas  98 102 54 71
Other fish  44 61 61 41
 
Source: LEI 
 
 
4.6.2.2  Fleets costs and earnings 
The value of the landings of the pelagic fleet in 2005 increased by almost 5% to more 
than €136m (Table 4.6.3). Vessel costs decreased by 11% and depreciation costs by 
8% while all other costs, more or less, remained the same. Gross cash flow increased 
by more than 50% to more than €25m and gross value-added increased by 18% to 
more than €61m. For an average vessel, all costs in 2005 increased, and especially 
fuel costs. Total fuel costs for the freezer fleet remained about the same in 2005 sim-
ply owing to the reduced fleet compared to 2004. On average, the freezer trawler fleet 
has faced a total loss of €4.5m in the last four years.  
 
Table 4.6.3  Fleet costs and earnings 
 
I
 
ndicator (€m) 2002 2003 2004 2005
Value of landings 126.1 143.3 130.7 136.6
Fuel costs 19.1 20.5 20.8 21.0
Other running costs 35.0 34.4 28.8 28.5
Vessel costs 20.8 21.5 29.2 26.0
Crew share 32.3 36.9 35.1 35.5
Gross cash flow 18.9 30.0 16.8 25.6
Depreciation 22.4 23.4 22.4 20.6
Interest 7.2 5.7 4.1 3.8
Net profit -10.7 0.9 -9.7 1.2
Gross value-added 51.2 66.9 51.9 61.1
 
Source: LEI 
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 The average value of landings per vessel in 2005 increased by 11% to more than 
€8.5m (Table 4.6.4). Net profit increased to €75,000 per vessel, whereas the fleet 
faced a loss in 2004 of €571,000 per vessel.  
 
Table 4.6.4  Costs and earnings (average per vessel) 
 
A
 
verage per vessel (€000) 2002 2003 2004 2005
Value of landings    7,418 8,432 7,688 8,538
Gross value-added      3,006 3,937 3,053 3,820
Gross cash flow     1,112 1,710 988 1,600
Net profit         -629 53 -571 75
 
Source: LEI 
4.6.3 Calculations and result 
In 2005/2006 an alternative gear for reducing by-catches of cetaceans by pelagic 
freezer trawlers, was tested by IMARES. These tests, however, have not been conclu-
sive. Therefore, in the cost-benefit analysis, several scenarios have been defined with 
different effects on catches of target species. For each of these scenarios, the eco-
nomic consequences of installing the adjusted gear have been elaborated. 
 
 
 
4.6.3.1 Definition of scenarios 
In all three scenarios, an initial investment in the alternative gear of €10,000 has been 
assumed. Furthermore, it is assumed that the gear has to be replaced every three 
years. In Scenario 1, the alternative gear has no effect on catches of the target species. 
In Scenario 2, catches of all target species are 5% lower than with the original gear. In 
Scenario 3, the negative effect on catches is assumed to be 10% for all target species. 
 
Table 4.6.5  Cost-Benefit Analysis of alternative gear: three scenarios 
 
 Investment in alternative gear Change in catches 
 
Scenario 1 € 10,000 every three years starting in year 1 0% (all species)
Scenario 2 € 10,000 every three years starting in year 1 -5% (all species)
Scenario 3 € 10,000 every three years starting in year 1 -10% (all species)
 
 
For all three scenarios, the effects on gross revenues, variable costs and margins have 
been calculated. In the calculations for the different scenarios, price flexibility is as-
sumed to be zero. The prices for these pelagic species are determined on the world 
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market and do not have a direct relation with the fluctuations in landings by the Dutch 
pelagic freezer trawler fleet. 
 
The Net Present Value of the effect on the margin10 has been calculated for 10, 20 
and 30 years. In the calculations of NPV, a (real) discount rate of 4% has been ap-
plied11. Economic results for the three scenarios are presented in Section 4.6.3.2 
 
 
4.6.3.2 Economic results 
The Net Present Value (NPV) of the economic effect of altering the gear can be de-
fined as the NPV after the gear change (Equation 1, Section 1.2) minus NPV without 
the gear change (Equation 2, Section 1.2). In this case, fixed costs and management 
costs are assumed to be constant. The additional costs of investment in the altered 
gear are treated as a change in variable costs. Under these assumptions the total (pri-
vate) economic effect of the gear change is equal to the NPV of the change in the 
margin. 
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In Scenario 1, the costs of the new gear are the only effect as the change in catches is 
assumed to be zero. In this scenario, the effect on NPV is equal to the change in vari-
able costs. In Scenarios 2 and 3 the negative change in gross revenues as result of the 
5% and 10% reduction in catches is added to this effect. Table 4.6.6 presents the eco-
nomic results in the base year (2005). Table 4.6.7 shows the projected results in the 
first 10 years after the gear change. 
 
Table 4.6.6   Economic results of Dutch pelagic fleet  in the base year 2005, (€000) 
 
 Pelagic freezer trawlers
Vessel level
Pelagic freezer trawlers
Fleet level
 
Value of Landings  8,538 136,608
Variable costs 3,283 52,528
Gross margin 5,255 84,080
Labour costs 2,219 35,504
Margin 3,036 48,576
 
Source: LEI 
__________________________________ 
10 Margin = gross revenues – variable costs – labour costs 
11 A real discount rate of 4% conforms to present practice in the evaluation of Dutch government 
investment plans 
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Table 4.6.7 Projected Results for Dutch pelagic freezer trawlers: Change in margin 
(vessel level), €000 
  
Nominal values 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
  
Scenario 1 -10 0 0 -10 0 0 -10 0 0 -3
Scenario 2 -437 -427 -427 -437 -437 -427 -427 -437 -427 -430
S
 
cenario 3 -864 -854 -854 -864 -864 -854 -854 -864 -854 
 
-857
Discounted values 
Y
 
ear 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
2015
Scenario 1 -10 0 0 -9 0 0 -8 0 0 -2
Scenario 2 -420 -410 -395 -388 -373 -351 -337 -332 -312 -302
Scenario 3 -831 -821 -789 -768 -738 -702 -675 -656 -624 -602
 
 
In Scenario 1, the change of margin in the first year of operation is equal to the extra 
costs of the adjusted gear, €10,000, which represents 0.3% of the margin in the base 
year. In Scenarios 2 and 3, the change of margin is the sum of the costs of the new 
gear and the reduction in gross revenues as result of lower catches of the target spe-
cies with the new gear. In Scenarios 2 and 3, the change in margin in the first year is 
€437,000 and €864,000 respectively or 14% and 28% of the margin in the base year.  
 
Table 4.6.8  Projected results for Dutch pelagic freezer trawlers: Net present value 
(NPV) over 10, 20, and 30 years 
 
Vessel level €000 Fleet level €000 
 10 years 20 years 30 years 10 years 20 years 30 years
 
Scenario 1 -29 -45 -56 Scenario 1 -456 -719 -897
Scenario 2 -3,621 -5,977 -7,568 Scenario 2 -57,942 -95,632 -121,094
Scenario 3 -7,206 -11,901 -15,072 Scenario 3 -115,296 -190,413 -241,159
 
 
Table 4.6.8 presents the NPV of the changes in margin after 10, 20 and 30 years at the 
vessel level and the fleet level. At the vessel level, the NPV after 30 years varies from 
€56,000 in Scenario 1 to €15m in Scenario 2. At the fleet level, the NPV varies from 
€897,000 to €241m. This means that the positive NPV of saving the cetaceans for a 
period of thirty years will at least have to compensate for these losses in order to 
make the gear adjustment beneficial from a societal perspective. 
 
